On Minerals

...because they would not proportion the matter, nor touch it, nor transmute it; for all such things seem to reside in the matter itself and are not separated from it. Through this and similar arguments, the saying of Plato is refuted—yet he spoke more probably than all the ancients. Hermes [spoke] better regarding Higher things Hermes spoke better concerning the cause of the power of stones because we know that the powers of all lower things descend from the higher ones. For the higher things, through their substance, light, position, motion, and figure, flow into the lower things, providing all the noble powers that are within them. However, this saying is imperfect in the context of physics—although perhaps in astronomy and magic it might be sufficient—because in physics, we speak of the cause that is operating within the matter itself. Such a cause is either elemental, or it arises from the qualities of the elements as they exist in a mixture comixto, or it is the substantial form that follows such temperaments complexiones original: "complexiones," referring to the specific balance of the four qualities—hot, cold, moist, and dry—within a substance. Ptolemy For Ptolemy teaches in the book called The Fruit original: "quialarba," likely a corruption of the Centiloquium or Karpos attributed to Ptolemy that the effects of the stars are diverse and uncertain because, in lower things, the stellar influence reaches them through "something else" and "by accident." By "something else," he means through the elemental powers that provide the immediate form. By "accident," he means they do not reach lower things except through a "universal being" that is unconfused and of uncertain dispositions; this is because sometimes matter is receptive to celestial power, and sometimes not at all; sometimes it receives it in small measure, and sometimes in great measure. Many who divine by the stars, being ignorant of this, often lie, and they make the science of astrology abominable with their lies, even though it is actually good and very useful. He rejects Avicenna What Avicenna says regarding wonders prodigies seems itself to be prodigious original: "pdigiosa," meaning both miraculous and monstrously unbelievable. For the imagination cannot in any way reach the celestial Intelligences; such perceptions only exist in them if they are not explained by the motion of the heavens and elemental qualities, since nothing is disordered in those celestial beings. This will be shown elsewhere, as many things must be allowed for now, but these things ought to be demonstrated appropriately. It suffices here that in physics and in the book On the Heavens and the World Aristotle's De Caelo, these things have been perfectly discussed as far as physical consideration permits. For the practical intellects are formal in themselves toward the work of nature, which the celestial motion explains like an instrument. Nor is there ever any conception in the Mover the intelligence guiding a celestial sphere except of such a kind. From where it is that it intends this or that effect has been partially discussed in On the Heavens and the World, or it must be determined in First Philosophy Metaphysics.

Chapter 4: On the true cause of the power of precious stones.

Constantine. Albert's opinion on the cause of the power of stones

Refuting, therefore, all these previous opinions, we say with Constantine Constantine the African, an influential 11th-century medical translator and certain others that the power of a stone is caused by the "species" species the essential nature or 'kind' of a thing and the substantial form of the stone itself. Now, some powers of mixed things have the ingredients of the mixture as their cause, but others have the species itself as their cause. This is seen more clearly in those things that are more perfectly "specified" and formed than others, such as a human being. A human, by the very operation that makes him human, possesses the power to understand—an ability that is not caused by any physical temperament. The same is true in brute animals and plants, as is proven in the Ethics Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the proper operation and the proper good of every thing follow its species, by which it is formed and perfected in its natural being. All tempered mixtures are merely the instruments of such species, because the species contains them all; when the species no longer exists, the mixture is corrupted and dissolved. For form contains matter as its divine and best part; it is not contained by the matter, nor does it "desire" matter by its nature, for it only needs matter for its existence as an individual, not for its divine essence. These matters will be more clearly elucidated in the book On the Intellect and the Intelligible and in First Philosophy. This form, therefore, stands between two things here: the celestial powers from which it is granted, and the tempered matter into which it is infused. If it is considered in itself, it is a simple essence capable of only one operation—for whatever is one can only effect one thing, and from a single source comes a single effect, as the whole community of philosophers teaches. But if this form is considered as it is influenced by the celestial powers (multiplied through the higher and lower bodies, and all the images and circles which the twelve signs with their stars distribute over the horizon of that thing into which the form is infused) and, secondly, according to how the elemental powers work upon it—then the form itself will be very "multiple" in its natural powers which surround its simple essence. Thus, it will be capable of producing many effects, even though it perhaps has only one "proper" operation. For it cannot be said that the powers of the causes do not remain in the effects. This is why almost every thing is useful not for just one purpose, but for many, when its operations are understood. When compared to the matter of which it is the form, the form is more powerful—and even "more" or "less" powerful—which is why Hermes rightly says that stones of the same species are found to be more powerful or less powerful in their effects. Perhaps some are even found to have no effect of their species at all because of the "confusion" or defect of the matter—just as a man may have no human operation despite being a man [if his body is too defective]. For although a species, in a logical sense, does not participate in "more or less," we nevertheless see the species present in almost all things according to "more or less" in their actual existence and in the strength of their actions. Therefore, in those things that possess powers following their species, objects are found to be more effective, less effective, or entirely incapable of the operations that naturally follow that species. It should be well remembered what is said in the second book of the Meteorology Aristotle's Meteorologica: that the species of stones are, in a way, "mortal" like individuals. Just as with men, when stones are kept for a long time away from the places where they were generated, they "die" lose their specific powers and retain the name of their species only equivocally—though their physical shape and color might only be lost over a very long time. And just as in the creation of animals there is sometimes such a disharmony dyscrasia in the temperament that the human soul cannot take hold, leaving only the elements and the human shape; so it is also in the generation of stones, either because of the disorder of the matter or because of the overwhelming powers of the celestial bodies moving in series, as we say in the second book of our Physics. These things, then, are what have been said regarding the powers of stones in general, etc.