BOOK ONE. HIPPARCHUS. PAGE I.

MARSILIO'S ARGUMENT ON THE HIPPARCHUS.

The definition of profit is gathered.

Plato's purpose in the Hipparchus is to teach us that all men desire the good: even those who seem to go astray because of greed desire the good. For those people are indeed desirous of profit; profit is useful, and the useful is truly good; therefore, they desire the good. Furthermore, profit is the opposite of loss. Since loss is harmful, it is an evil; therefore, profit is the opposite of evil. The opposite of evil is good; therefore, profit is good. For this reason, since even those who seem to turn away from the desire for good actually desire the good, nothing now stands in the way of all men desiring the good. However, the good is twofold. One is the end. The other is for the sake of the end. The former is to be sought for its own sake; the latter for the sake of something else. The desire for the former is called the will; the choice of the latter is election. The former is venerable; the latter is useful. We enjoy the former; we use the latter. The attainment of the former is called happiness; the attainment of the latter is called profit. Profit, therefore, is the acquisition of a useful good, which can lead to the attainment of the venerable good. But that which does not contribute to this is neither useful itself, nor is its attainment profit. The desire for profit is inherent in all by nature. Therefore, the desire for profit, which is inherent in all by nature, is to be praised. However, false opinion is to be blamed: for while it is ignorant of what is truly useful and profitable, it twists the natural appetite toward the opposite. Plato teaches all these things covertly, while Socrates refutes the false definitions which Hipparchus offers concerning the desire for profit, both by induction and by reasoning. Yet Plato uses this proposition—that all men desire the good—as an obvious premise to conclude that all men by nature desire profit, and that this natural desire is praiseworthy. This is the conclusion which Socrates introduces in a certain direct way by three modes of arguing: namely, by example, by induction, and by reasoning. But in a certain inverse way, from this whole dispute, we gather through argument from the lesser a fortiori that most confirmed proposition: "All men desire the good," which is the ultimate end of this book; whereas the primary end is to show that all are desirous of profit, and that this is not to be blamed.

HIPPARCHUS, OR CONCERNING THE DESIRE FOR PROFIT OR THE ZEAL FOR GAINING.

SOCRATES. HIPPARCHUS.

The first false definition of the desire for profit.

SOCRATES. What exactly is the desire for profit? And who are the profit-seekers? HIPPARCHUS. To me, at least, they seem to be those who think they should profit from things worthy of no esteem. SO. Do they seem to you to know that these things are of no value, or to be ignorant of it? For if they are ignorant, do you call madmen "profit-seekers"? HIP. I do not call them mad, but rather clever and wicked, and overcome by profit; they know the things from which they dare to profit are of no value, and yet they dare to profit through impudence. SO. Do you call someone of this sort a profit-seeker? For instance, if a farmer, while planting and knowing the plant is of no value, nevertheless thinks he should profit from it—do you call such a man by that name? HIP. In every case, Socrates, the profit-seeker thinks he must seek gain. SO. Do not pour out words so rashly, as if you were angry with someone because of an injury received; but rather, paying attention to me, answer as if I were questioning you again from the beginning. Do you admit that a profit-seeker knows the value of that from which he thinks it worthy to profit? HIP. I admit it. Refutation by induction. SO. Who is skilled regarding the value of plants, and in what region and at what time it is worthy to plant? (To bring into our midst some of those wise words which elegant legal orators use). HIP. I believe it is the farmer. SO. Do you call "worthy of profit" anything other than thinking something ought to be profited from? HIP. That is it. SO. Do not try to deceive me, a man already elderly, since you are so young, by answering now things which you yourself do not believe; but answer as truthfully as you can. Do you think any farmer, knowing a tree is in no way worthy of planting, thinks he will profit from it? HIP. No, by Jove. SO. Furthermore, do you think a man skilled in horses, knowing he is providing worthless fodder to his horse, is ignorant that he is ruining the horse? HIP. Not at all. SO. Therefore, he does not think he will profit from such fodder. HIP. Not in the least. SO. And a pilot who has equipped a ship of no value with a tiller and sails—do you think he is ignorant that he will suffer loss and incur danger, lest he himself and the ship and everything in the ship perish? HIP. Certainly not. SO. He does not, therefore, think he will profit from such instruments of no value. HIP. Not in the least. SO. Likewise, does a leader of war, seeing an army relying on worthless arms, hope or think it worthy to attain any profit from them? HIP. None. SO. In the same way, a flute-player with a flute, a lyre-player with a lyre, an archer with a bow, and to embrace it briefly, any craftsman or any other man skilled in tools and other equipment—if he has things of no value, does he think he will ever profit from them? HIP. It appears not. SO. Whom, then, do you call profit-seekers? For they are not those whom we mentioned above, who think they ought to profit from things worthy of no consideration. HIP. But in this way, O most excellent man, as you yourself speak...