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Second false definition of a profit-seeker.
Refutation by logic.
...you seek, no human would be a profit-seeker. But I understand those to be profit-seekers who, because of an insatiable greed, thirst in a wondrous way for even the smallest and most worthless things of no value, and seek profit even in those. SOCRATES. However, O best of men, they do not discern that those things are of no value. For already we have refuted ourselves by logic in this matter, showing that it would be impossible. HIPPARCHUS. So it seems to me. SOCRATES. If they do not recognize it, they are therefore ignorant; yet they think that things which are of no value are to be highly prized. HIPPARCHUS. It appears so. SOCRATES. Do not profit-seekers desire profit? HIPPARCHUS. Certainly. SOCRATES. And is profit the opposite of loss? HIPPARCHUS. It is. SOCRATES. Is it good for anyone to be affected by loss? HIPPARCHUS. For no one. SOCRATES. But is it an evil? HIPPARCHUS. Entirely. SOCRATES. Therefore, are men harmed by loss? HIPPARCHUS. They are harmed. SOCRATES. Is loss therefore an evil? HIPPARCHUS. An evil. SOCRATES. Is profit the opposite of loss? HIPPARCHUS. The opposite. SOCRATES. Is profit therefore a good? HIPPARCHUS. Certainly. SOCRATES. Therefore, do you call those who love the good "profit-seekers"? HIPPARCHUS. It seems so. SOCRATES. You certainly do not call profit-seekers "insane," O friend. But do you yourself love what is good, or do you not love it? HIPPARCHUS. I love it indeed. SOCRATES. Is there anything good that you do not strive for, but rather evil? HIPPARCHUS. Not by Zeus original: "per Iovem". SOCRATES. But perhaps you strive for all good things. HIPPARCHUS. All of them. SOCRATES. Ask me as well whether I do too; I will confess that I myself love good things. But besides me and you, do not all other men love good things and hate evil things? HIPPARCHUS. It seems so. SOCRATES. And have we not confessed that profit is a good? HIPPARCHUS. Indeed. SOCRATES. Therefore, all men appear to be profit-seekers in this way; but in the way we spoke of before, no one would be a profit-seeker. Which of these two arguments, then, would one use without erring? HIPPARCHUS. If someone, O Socrates, were to define a profit-seeker correctly, he would, I think, judge him to be a profit-seeker who is devoted to those things—and thinks it proper to seek profit in them—from which good men would never dare to profit.
Third false definition of a profit-seeker.
Refutation by logic.
SOCRATES. But do you not hold to what was agreed between us a little while ago: namely, that to profit is to be affected by utility? HIPPARCHUS. What then? SOCRATES. That we also all agreed in this: to always want the good? HIPPARCHUS. We confessed it. SOCRATES. And will not good men also seek all profit, if all such things are good? HIPPARCHUS. But not those profits by which they might be harmed. SOCRATES. Do you call "being harmed" the same as suffering a loss, or something else? HIPPARCHUS. Nothing other than suffering a loss. SOCRATES. Are men affected by loss because of profit, or rather because of loss? HIPPARCHUS. By both; for they are affected by loss both from a loss and from a shameful profit. SOCRATES. Does it seem to you that anything useful and good can be shameful? HIPPARCHUS. Not at all. SOCRATES. Did we not a little while ago concede that profit is the opposite of loss, which is an evil? HIPPARCHUS. I admit it. SOCRATES. And since it is the opposite of an evil, it is a good? HIPPARCHUS. We conceded it. SOCRATES. Therefore, as you see, you are trying to deceive me on purpose by bringing up things contrary to what we confessed above. HIPPARCHUS. Not by Zeus, O Socrates! But on the contrary, you are deceiving me, and I know not how you turn the matter upside down in the discussion. SOCRATES. Speak fair words, I pray. For I would not be doing right unless I obeyed a good and wise man. HIPPARCHUS. Who is that, or what is this at last? SOCRATES. My and your kinsman,
Hipparchus praises Pisistratus so that the edge of the dispute might be relaxed.
First Homer 40 [?] 7 July
Hipparchus, the son of Pisistratus of Philaidae, who was both the eldest and the wisest of the sons of Pisistratus, and who performed many other famous works of wisdom. He was the first to bring the books of Homer into this city, and he compelled the poets who sing the verses to recite them in order among the Athenians, which is observed even in these times. And he summoned Anacreon of Teos to this city, having sent a ship of fifty oars; furthermore, he always kept Simonides of Ceos with him, honoring him with great gifts. He did all these things wishing to instruct his citizens, so that he might rule over them living as well as possible, thinking it not at all right to begrudge anyone wisdom, since he was noble and good. When the citizens were abundantly learned and admired his wisdom, he turned his mind to educating the farmers and foreigners. And for that reason, he erected columns or square stones in every crossroads of the city. From that wisdom which he had partly learned and partly discovered himself, selecting the better parts, he enclosed them in elegiac verses and inscribed the precepts of wisdom, so much so that the citizens no longer admired those famous Delphic inscriptions: "Know thyself," "Nothing in excess," and others of this kind, but revered the precepts of Hipparchus as being wiser. Then, those passing by here and there, tasting his wisdom by reading, proceeded from the fields and woods to the rest of the institutions of learning. There were, moreover, two inscriptions on some columns on the left of each, which were inscribed:
The column called "Speaking Mercury."
Certain precepts of Hipparchus.
"Speaking Mercury" The Greek 'Hermes', which stood in the middle of the city and the people. On some, however, on the right: "This is a monument of Hipparchus: Proceed in order, thinking just things." Likewise, many other famous verses could be seen on the other columns. But on the Styrian road, this was inscribed: "This is a monument of Hipparchus: Do not deceive a friend." For which reason, I would never dare to deceive you, my friend, and resist such a great man. After he died, the Athenians were oppressed for three years under his brother Hippias the tyrant. You yourself have heard from all the elders that only those three years did tyranny flourish in this city; but in the remaining times, the Athenians lived in the same manner as when Saturn was reigning A reference to the Golden Age. It is handed down by more refined men that the cause of his death was not that which is commonly reported—namely, the contempt of his sister as a Basket-bearer Canophoria: a ritual role in Greek festivals—for to believe that is absurd. But they say that Harmodius had been the beloved and pupil of Aristogiton, who hoped that something great would come from this education, for he thought Hipparchus would be an adversary. Meanwhile, it happened that Harmodius loved a certain nobleman whose name I do not quite remember, who at first admired Harmodius and Aristogiton as wise men. But then, having become an intimate
The dispute is repeated but constructively, where he has inserted the history in the middle of this refutation.
of Hipparchus, he began to despise them; wherefore they, being indignant, slew Hipparchus. HIPPARCHUS. You seem then, O Socrates, either not to think me a friend, or if you do think me a friend, to believe Hipparchus very little. For I cannot be persuaded by you in this discussion that you are not deceiving me. SOCRATES. And yet I am willing, just as if I were playing a game of checkers, to retract anything from the previous points, so that you do not think yourself deceived. Do you want that point changed which we said: that all men desire good things? HIPPARCHUS. I do not. SOCRATES. What about that which we conceded: that loss, and being affected by loss, is an evil? HIPPARCHUS. I do not want that changed either. SOCRATES. But what about that: that profit and profiting [are the opposite] both to loss itself and to that which is loss...