The Complete Works of Plato Translated by Marsilio Ficino

...should so temper and restrain his actions that he may easily tend toward the good which wisdom itself had discovered, and toward which prudence had then directed him. This is indeed achieved through the moral virtues, all of which Plato encompasses under the single name of justice. And from these two referring to wisdom/prudence and moral virtue the governance of human affairs consists. Furthermore, it belongs to the same person to know how to rightly govern a single man, a family, and a state. Therefore, he who is moral is likewise a master of civil affairs and emerges as a fit king. From which it is concluded that all these things are contained within the very duty of the philosopher: wisdom, prudence, justice, and moral, domestic, civil, and royal discipline. Through wisdom, he knows divine things; through prudence and justice, he governs human things, while he administers his own affairs, the affairs of the family, and the affairs of the state. Such is the duty of the philosopher himself, which Plato explains more extensively in his books On the Republic, but signifies more briefly in this one. And first, he refutes two opinions of others concerning the philosopher’s duty. The first seems to have been that of Solon, or someone similar, saying that it is to learn as many things as possible; the second was that of Hippias the sophist, who wanted philosophy to be the skill in all arts. Finally, having refuted these, he briefly hints at the opinion we stated before. Socrates, therefore, is imagined to have disputed these things in the school of Dionysius—who taught the elements of grammar to Plato—against two disciples of Dionysius; then, he recounts from the beginning what he had treated in the schools within his own circle of family and friends.

What is contained in the duty of the philosopher

PLATO’S DIALOGUE ON PHILOSOPHY, OR THE LOVERS.

The occasion of the dialogue: which is one of the things consistent with the dialogue itself, even if it is sometimes omitted.

It is seen that the form of the dialogue is twofold: when the narration of the whole conversation is the dialogue alone, and when characters are introduced speaking.

The order of analytical questions: one cannot know what kind a thing is unless it is known what it is; nor what it is, if it is unknown whether it is.

The first definition of philosophy according to Solon.

Refutation regarding the method of other studies.

A large square woodcut initial 'D' featuring a classical or biblical scene with several figures in a landscape setting. Having entered the school of Dionysius the grammarian, I saw certain youths displaying an honest disposition, born of noble parents, and with them their friends as well. Moreover, two young men were present contending with one another; but I had not quite noticed what their question was. Nevertheless, they seemed to be disputing about Anaxagoras or Oenopides: drawing circles, and imitating certain inclinations with their hands with the greatest zeal. I, however, touching with my elbow the friend of one of them next to whom I was sitting, asked why the youths were contending so, and whether it was something great and beautiful in which they placed such study. Then he said, "What 'great and beautiful' thing? For those boys are trifling about things that are sublime, and they chatter away at philosophy." I, marvelling at his answer, said, "O youth, does practicing philosophy seem shameful to you? Or why do you answer so bitterly?" But the other one sitting next to him, a certain rival of his, when he had heard both me asking and that one answering, said, "It is not profitable for you, Socrates, to ask this man whether he thinks philosophy is shameful or not. Have you not realized that he has spent his whole life in a kind of swelling, and satiety, and sleepiness? So that you might believe he would answer you anything other than that philosophy is shameful?" Now, this man was learned in music, but the other whom he was snapping at was learned in gymnastics. And it seemed to me that I ought to let go of the other whom I had first questioned, since he showed himself experienced not so much in disputing, but rather in acting. I decided, however, to question the one who showed himself to be wiser, so that if I could in some way, I might bring back some benefit from him. I said to him, therefore, that I had proposed the question in common. "But if you think you will answer better than he, I ask you that same thing now: does it seem to you that practicing philosophy is beautiful or otherwise?" While we were saying these things, the youths heard us; and having dropped the contention that was between them, they prepared themselves in silence to hear the things we were discussing. But he answered me, and indeed very ambitiously: "If ever, O Socrates, I should consider practicing philosophy to be shameful, I would not think myself a man, nor anyone else so inclined." Hinting at his rival, he said these things in such a voice that his friends could overhear. Here I said: "It seems to you, then, that practicing philosophy is beautiful?" "And most especially so," he said. "What then," I said, "does it seem possible to you that anyone can know whether something is shameful or beautiful, unless from the beginning he has known what the thing itself is?" "No." "Do you know then," I said, "what it is to practice philosophy?" "I certainly know." "What is it?" "What else than according to the sayings of Solon? For Solon used to say: 'I grow old always learning many things.' And to me indeed it seems that a man who is to be a philosopher ought always to learn something in this way, whether he be younger or older, so that in life he learns as many things as possible." And at first, he seemed to me to have said something. Then, reflecting with myself, I asked whether philosophy seemed to him to be polymathia—that is, learning many things. polymathia And he said, "Entirely so." "Do you think philosophy is only something beautiful, or also good?" "And good as well." "Do you look upon that as peculiar to philosophy, or do you judge in the same way in other things? As for example: the study of gymnastics, is it not only beautiful, but also good?" Then he, very ironically, brought forth two different points. "Against this man," he said, "let it be said that it is neither. But against you, O Socrates, I confess it is both beautiful and good at the same time." "Therefore, in the gymnasia, do you think the study of gymnastics involves much labor?" "And most especially so," he said, "just as I think learning many things in philosophizing is philosophy." "Therefore, do you believe that those zealous for gymnastics desire anything else than that their bodies be in good condition?" "That very thing," he said. "Do not many labors produce a good habit of the body?" "In what way," he said, "could a robust body be made from few labors?" But next, it seemed to me that the gymnast ought to be provoked, so that he might bring me help from his skill in gymnastics. I then questioned him: "But why are you silent, O best of men, while he is saying these things? Do you also think that a man gains strength from many labors, or from moderate ones?" "I indeed, O Socrates, would dare to assert that the body is in good condition from moderate ones." "From what?" I said. "I do not mean a man who is wakeful and hungry, and having an unaccustomed spine likely referring to a lean or strained back, and thinned by cares." And when he had said these things, the youths were delighted and laughed. But that other one blushed. Then I said, "What do you then? Do you grant that neither small nor great labors produce a good habit of the body, but moderate ones? Or do you fight against..."