THIRD BOOK

He proceeds to gather a true definition of philosophy by induction from reason. Which definition is this: Philosophy is that by which each person knows themselves and others, whether they are good or evil. And philosophy is that by which the following are the same: kingly, tyrannical, civil, masterly, and household management, as well as justice and prudence. Likewise, philosophy exists while we know, not by learning the most things, nor by practicing the arts. Beautiful arguments taken from the same, the different, and the contrary. He who knows or is ignorant of whether others are good or evil: it must be that this man also either knows or is ignorant of himself. Explanation of the inscription at Delphi: You should cultivate Prudence and Justice.

...we conceded: as long as craftsmen are present, philosophers are useless, and craftsmen are always present. Have these things not been conceded? They have. We confess then, as it seems according to your speech—if indeed to philosophize is to be skilled in the arts in the way you yourself said—that they themselves are bad and useless as long as there are arts among men. But it is not so, oh friend. Neither is philosophizing to be studiously occupied with the arts, nor to lean upon many businesses, nor to learn many things thoroughly, but it is something else. Indeed, I would consider this both absurd and contrary to reason. Those who know how to break horses correctly: are they the ones who make them better, or others? Those who make them better. What about dogs? Do not those who know how to make them better also know how to restrain them correctly? Entirely so. Therefore, the same art both makes them better and restrains them correctly. The same. What then? Does the same art which makes them better and restrains them correctly also recognize the good and the bad, or is it another? The same, he said. Will you then wish to confess the same regarding men: that the art which makes men best is the same as that which both restrains them correctly and recognizes who are good and who are evil? Exactly, he said. Does not whatever knows one also know many, and whatever knows many know one? So it is. And in horses and all other things, is it the same way? The same way. What science is it that correctly punishes the intemperate and the transgressors of laws in the city? Is it not the judicial? Exactly. Do you call justice anything other than this? Not another. Is it not by the same science that they correctly chastise and punish, and also distinguish the good from the bad? The same. Whoever truly knows one will also know many? He will know. But he who is ignorant of many will also be ignorant of one? He agreed. If, therefore, being a horse, he should be ignorant of good and bad horses, will he also be ignorant of himself, what sort he is? He conceded. And if, being an ox, he should not know which are good or bad oxen, is it necessary that he also be ignorant of what sort he himself is? It is so, he said. In the same way also if he were a dog? He confessed. Now truly, since a man, being who he is, is ignorant of good and bad men, will he not also be ignorant of himself, whether he is good or bad? He nodded. To be ignorant of oneself, is that to be wise or to be foolish? To be foolish. Therefore, to know oneself is to be wise. I confess it, he said. This therefore, as it seems, is what the inscription at Delphi The famous "Know Thyself" (Gnothi Seauton) at the Temple of Apollo. also commands: namely, to cultivate Prudence and Justice. It appears so. By this same art we also know how to restrain correctly. He nodded. Therefore, that by which we know how to restrain correctly is certainly justice. But that by which we can distinguish both ourselves and others is prudence. It seems so. Therefore, justice and prudence are the same. It appears so. Furthermore, cities are then best governed when the unjust pay the penalty. You speak the truth. And this is the civil science. It is, he said. What truly, whenever one man correctly establishes a city, is not the name fitting for him "tyrant" and "king"? He nodded. Does he not govern by the tyrannical or kingly art? Indeed. These faculties, therefore, are the same as the ones above. It seems so. What truly, when one man correctly arranges a house, what name would most fit him? Is it not "household manager" and "master"? It fits. Does he also rule the family well by justice, or by another faculty? By justice. It is the same, therefore, as it appears: king, tyrant, statesman, household manager, master, prudent man, and just man. And it is also one art: kingly, tyrannical, civil, masterly, household management, justice, and prudence. It seems so. What then for the philosopher: whenever a physician says anything about the sick, is it not shameful not to be able to follow his words, nor to conjecture anything from himself? And likewise whenever any other of the craftsmen speaks? In the same way. But when a judge or someone else of those whom we mentioned a little while ago speaks, is it not absurd in these matters neither to follow their words nor to conjecture through oneself? Why would it not be absurd, oh Socrates, to have nothing to contribute in such great matters? Whether therefore, I said, do we say that in these things the philosopher ought to be like a pentathlete An athlete who competes in five different events; here used to mean a "generalist" who is second-best at everything. and, possessing the second-place parts, be useless as long as someone of the superiors is present? Or rather, first of all, he himself ought not to offer his house to be administered by anyone, nor to hold the second-place parts in this, but to chastise all things from himself, judging justly, if indeed his family ought to be administered correctly? He assented to me. And I added: If also some friend should commit the account of his life to him, or a city should commit something to be discerned or judged, would it not be shameful for him, oh friend, to be second in these things, or third, and not to stand forth as the leader? So it seems to me. Let it be far from us then, oh best of men, that to philosophize is to learn many things and to treat the arts. When I had said these things, that "wise" man Referring to the rival in the dialogue who argued for broad, superficial learning. was affected by shame from what had been said and was silent. But the unlearned man affirmed it was so, and all the others praised the words.

THE END OF THE BOOK ON PHILOSOPHY.

The Argument of Marsilio Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), the famous Renaissance Neoplatonist who translated Plato into Latin. on the Book entitled Theages, or on Wisdom.

A large decorative initial 'D' featuring a blocky letter set within an ornate square frame filled with classical foliate scrolls and floral patterns.

Wisdom is distinguished in this dialogue, and the final member of the distinction is assumed to be investigated in such a way that it may be clear by what means it is acquired by men. In the first partition, wisdom is said to be twofold. One is absolute, the other conditional. Absolute is that which is named wisdom simply, without any addition. Conditional is that which is not called wisdom simply, but a "certain wisdom." The former is defined thus: The knowledge of those things about which science can be had. Moreover, science is had concerning those things which are always the same and in the same way. Of this kind are the highest principles of things and the eternal reasons of all things; this, moreover, is called "divine," from which it follows that wisdom is the science of divine things, which is indeed absolute wisdom. Conditional wisdom, however, is common to all arts and faculties. For the summit of any art is called a "certain wisdom," such as the wisdom of steering, the wisdom of chariot-driving, or military wisdom...