The Tree of Science

Arbor Elementalis. 5

...it assumes from parts, and insofar as other parts receive similarities from it, these are those similarities which accidents receive: such as magnitude which is good through goodness, and duration similarly, and power, etc. And in this is the general source for other accidents, which proceed from the substantial parts.

On Magnitude.

Magnitude is that being through which goodness, duration, etc. are great: encompassing all extremities of being. Magnitude is substantially the root of the tree: so that it itself may be substantially great, and that magnitude may be what it is, for if magnitude were not a substantial principle: smallness would be in goodness, duration, power, and virtue, etc. and it would not be what it is: nor would the tree be great through it, which is impossible. Therefore, magnitude is substantial in itself: and the similarities it gives are accidental, just as we said about goodness. But since magnitude is one part of the tree: the tree is substantially great through it: just as the whole is essentially the whole through its parts. And to prove that duration, power, and the other roots of the tree, with the exception of contrariety, are substantial parts: the proof we gave for goodness, magnitude, etc., which are substantial parts, suffices. However, we do not say that contrariety is a substantial part: as we proved in the general table. Through this magnitude, knowledge is had of the magnitude of the tree, which it has according to its roots, and according to its trunk, branches, boughs, leaves, flowers, and fruits.

On Duration.

Duration is a property: through which goodness, magnitude, etc. endure. Goodness endures through duration in its existence and action, just as duration, which is good in its existence and action through goodness. Hence, just as a root assumes influence from the earth with which it participates: so duration is the root whence goodness assumes influence for enduring in itself, and also for making firm the similarities which goodness gives to the other parts of substance. And what we say about goodness: follows for power, etc. Therefore, duration is the reason through which the tree, and all its parts, endure.

On Power.

Power is that, through which goodness, magnitude, duration, etc. can exist and act. Goodness is: and insofar as it is: it can be, for if it could not be, it would not be. Because goodness is thus under the aspect of power, insofar as it can be, just as power is under the aspect of goodness: insofar as it is good through goodness. And since goodness can have an operation in itself through power, namely to make good: which it could not have without power: it is necessary that power itself have the ability to make possible: through which goodness can have in itself the ability to make good, which it could not have: if power did not have the ability to make possible. And therefore power is the root of the tree with making good: insofar as making good is through making possible. And the same is true for making great, enduring, and the others. Wherefore in the tree, making possible follows from possible things, according to the nature of itself and its parts. And those things which are impossible in it: are impossible, because under the aspect of