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in the special edition, p. 346. Ez. Spanheim touched upon this sentiment in his Remarks on the Caesars of Emperor Julian, p. 258, and at the end of page 112, and Clement of Alexandria and other Platonic Church Fathers mention it throughout. See Segaar on Clement of Alexandria, Who is the Rich Man that shall be Saved?, p. 166.
p. 27, 1. κάθαρσις λέγων speaking of purification] In the Phaedo, p. 69 c, p. 21 (Wyttenbach). Furthermore, concerning the purificatory virtues, cf. this interpreter on the same dialogue, p. 172. Here we will add a passage from Iamblichus, from his book On the Soul, apud Stobaeus, Eclogues I. 52, p. 1056 (Heeren): Plotinus and most Platonists assume the final purification to be the laying aside of the passions and of formative perceptions, the contempt for all opinion, the withdrawal from material thoughts, the filling up from intellect and Being, and the assimilation of the contemplating [subject] to the contemplated [object]. Olympiodorus, however, in his First Alcibiades, p. 54 and p. 145, distinguishes more methods of purification, among them the Pythagorean, the Socratic, the Peripatetic, (and the Stoic). Add also Marinus’s Life of Proclus, p. 42, regarding which Boissonade did not neglect these Plotinian matters. Furthermore, in all places where to purify and purification are mentioned, the proper force of the word must be held, which is to cast out filth. Hence Perseus and Hercules are said to be born for the purification of evils (Olympiodorus, First Alcibiades, p. 156 ff.). Regarding the force of this word, Baguet, a student of my Bekker, learnedly advised in his commentary on Dio Chrysostom, Orat. VIII, p. 136 ff.
— 4. συμπεφυρμένη mixed/mingled] It seems he took this word, often used by Plato, from the Phaedo, p. 17 (Wytt.). We have discussed it at greater length in our notes on Plotinus On Beauty, p. 246 ff.—Ὁμοπαθὴς having similar passions/sympathetic is also used by Plato, as in Republic V, p. 464, where Ast provided ὁμοιοπαθεῖς similar in passions (see Additions to the Commentary, p. 520), and Bekker brought back ὁμοπαθεῖς. Wyttenbach explained the difference briefly but accurately in his work on Plutarch’s How to Discern a Flatterer from a Friend, p. 539. Cf. Alberti, Philological Observations on the New Testament, p. 454, and Wetstein, N.T. II, p. 454.—Ὁμοπάθεια sympathy is read below in IV. 2 (before the middle) and IV. 7. 3 (at the beginning), ὁμοπαθεῖν in IV. 9. 1 and 2, ὁμοπαθὴς in VI. 4. 1, and ὁμοιοπαθὴς in IV. 4. 23, naturally in the Basel Edition.
p. 28, 1. μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ an imitation of that which is in the soul] Plato, Republic II, p. 382, p. 103 (Bekker): Since that which is in words is a certain imitation of the affection in the soul, and a phantom that has happened subsequently, etc. Regarding this...
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passage, Ast (p. 437) praises these words of Plotinus and Isocrates To Nicocles, Orat. III. § 3, p. 24 (Corai ed.).
— 2. ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ that which is in utterance] Regarding the spoken word (λόγῳ προφορικῷ), add the passage from Proclus in Alcibiades, p. 286, where he praises our Meletemata. Articulate voice is joined to the spoken word. For utterance (προφορὰ) is pronunciation, as Wyttenbach teaches on Plutarch’s On How to Listen to Poetry, p. 342. The inward word (ἐνδιάθετος) is distinguished from the spoken word. See the same learned man on Plutarch’s On the Right Way of Listening, p. 378 ff. I add a passage from Philo Judaeus, which is most important for understanding our passage. For he says the following in Life of Moses III, p. 154 (Mangey): For the Word is twofold, both in the universe and in the nature of man. In the universe, it is that which concerns incorporeal and paradigmatic ideas, from which the intelligible world was composed, and that which concerns visible things, which are indeed imitations and images of those ideas, from which this sensible world was completed. In man, one is inward, the other is spoken; and the one is like a spring, the other, having come from that one, flows forth. The seat of the former is the ruling faculty, while the seat of the latter, according to utterance, is the tongue, the mouth, and the entire other apparatus of the voice. Utterance will return below in II. 9. 1 and V. 1. 3.
— 7. ἀτελεστέρα—ἤδη already more imperfect] Marsilio filled this out with interpretation, as he did with six hundred other things, which for that very reason we do not touch upon. Otherwise, there would be no end to the laborious annotation, the kind of which Engelhardt has provided here and elsewhere.
— 12. οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν nor the Good] Plato, Republic VI, p. 509 A: One must not think that knowledge and truth are the Good, but just as it is right to think that light and sight are sun-like, but not right to consider them the sun, so here it is right to consider these two things as Good-like, but not right to consider either of them the Good. From this passage, both Plotinus and the remaining Platonists, Hermes Trismegistus, and Dionysius the Areopagite, took the opportunity to use this term; I have touched upon their passages in our Studies I, p. 101, and on Plotinus On Beauty, p. XCV, p. 231 ff., p. 268 ff., and p. 385. The Plotinian passages are: III. 8. 10, V. 3. 3 and 16, V. 6. 4 and 5, VI. 7. 15.
p. 29, 2. ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς from the conversion/return] In purification (τῇ καθάρσει), Plotinus had placed above the removal of alien things. Here follows the conversion/return. We must say a few words now about this concept. Let Gale speak first, who says the following on Iamblichus On the Mysteries, p. 291: "What he implies here (Iamblichus) concerning conversion is to be understood thus: According to the Platonists, conversion is the rectification of opposition. For since all things are from the One, therefore all things yearn for their principle and strive to return to it as much as they can. There are three principal conversions: according to essence, according to life, according to knowledge. Finally, in every principle (or superior thing) there is found remaining, procession, and conversion." See Porphyry’s Sentences 30 (p. 230 ff.). Opposition (ἔνστασις) is, however, an adversarial struggle, if you wish to use the Tertullian word. Proclus deals accurately and primarily with conversion in Elements of Theology, chap. XXXV ff., p. 61 ff., and chap. CLVIII, p. 235 ff., and no less in his commentary on Alcibiades, p. 16, 30 ff., 92, 194. (Olympiodorus, p. 9 ff.) To the former passage I added these notes: Proclus frequently uses conversion toward ourselves in what follows, i.e., the care of the self, when we return to ourselves and convert our mind. One arrives at it through attention or through diligent heedfulness and consideration of each thing. Both terms are also familiar to the Stoics; see Upton on Epictetus, Vol. III, p. 333, and p. 433 (Schweighauser), and Gataker on Marcus Antoninus IV. 32, p. 119. Among the Platonists, it suffices to cite Porphyry in Sentences § 34, p. 237, and Proclus on Plato’s Timaeus, p. 64. Compare now these Plotinian passages I. 4. 11, where there is both to be converted inward and to convert the will inward, and VI. 5. 12, where the other form is found, to convert (ἐπιστροφάω). Nicolaus of Methone also uses it frequently Against Proclus, p. 31 ff., and p. 113. Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names, chap. 4, § 6, 10, 12. Synesius, Epistle 57: For at the same time he turns away from matter and converts toward God. We will add more on the word opposition (ἔνστασις) at our IV. 5. 2. Next, θέα vision is that which is seen, or what the soul now beholds; but τύπος type/impression is the form and configuration marked from the impression of the vision, to use Apuleius’s words on Platonic Doctrine, p. 4 (Elmenhorst), p. 193 (Bosscha). I advised on this word above at I. 1. 9. In the following text, Engelhardt distinguishes types used in the plural from type used in the singular, declaring that the former denotes something lower and more ignoble than this single form of the One. Soon after, ἀποκείμενα laid away/neglected carries a signification of neglect and contempt, regarding which see Stephanus’s Thesaurus, p. 4919. προσβάλλειν to cast upon/strike and ἐπιβάλλειν to cast upon are frequently used concerning mingling and co-illumination, or concerning vision from Platonic doctrine; whence also apprehension and assault. See Wyttenbach and our annotations on Plotinus On Beauty, p. 383, and his observations on Plutarch, p. 285 ff. Finally, at the end of the chapter, Engelhardt is uncertain about the word ἀλλότριαι alien/foreign. He prefers ἀλλότριοι aliens/foreigners, with we being understood; for we are also alien from the sciences unless we act according to them. Taylor: For sciences also are foreign, etc. But since our best books show ἀλλότριαι, this must be accepted, provided you think or write in the sciences themselves, in this sense: since even in the sciences, if we in no way act according to them, they are alien (to us).