Plotini Opera Omnia cum Ficini commentariis

Proclus, p. 50, ed. Fabricius, p. 17, Boissonade: "And he also chastened anger, as much as was possible, so that it might either not be moved at all, or that the soul which joins in the anger might not be the rational one." Therefore, the rational soul must be understood in this place.

— 16. γειτνιάσεως of vicinity/neighborhood] Plato, Laws VIII. p. 842. e, p. 103, Bekker: "neighboring to another stranger—shall be neighboring." Lucian, Symposium 33, p. 440, ed. Hemsterhuis-Reitz. γειτνίασις vicinity is found in Plutarch, Life of Pericles, ch. 19, p. 301, Corais. Concerning the forms of that verb, see Lobeck on Phrynichus, Eclogae, p. 82. Regarding the word γειτόνημα neighboring matter, which Plato also uses, we shall speak in reference to V. 1. 3, p. 484. A. γειτονέω to neighbor is frequently met with in these Enneads, such as II. 1. 8, III. 9. 2, IV. 3. 9, etc. γειτνιάσεως will recur below on p. 317. D.

p. 31, 7. θεὸς—καὶ δαίμων god—and spirit] These pertain to the distinctions between Gods and spirits: a matter upon which others had established various opinions since the time of Empedocles (see Plutarch, The Obsolescence of Oracles, p. 418. E. and Sturz on Empedocles, p. 296 ff.). Proclus and Olympiodorus argue copiously about this subject in the first Alcibiades. See, for example, Proclus p. 31, 67 ff., p. 90, 123, and Olympiodorus p. 15 ff.—What follows, "but a god, of those following the first," pertains to the doctrine concerning the chorus or retinue of gods of Jupiter, which the followers of this school fashioned from the most noble passage of the Platonic Phaedrus (p. 246. c, 247). No less did the same Platonists add a chorus of spirits to each of the mundane Gods as well (Plutarch, Obsolescence of Oracles, p. 421, p. 724 Wyttenbach; Proclus in the first Alcibiades, p. 68: "For every mundane god leads a certain order of spirits, which proximately gives its own power, etc." For the following text must also be read).

— 11. συνῳκίσθη was cohabited/settled together] Concerning the use of this verb, compare what has been gathered in Stephanus’s Thesaurus, p. 6626. Add Wyttenbach on Plutarch’s Conjugal Precepts, p. 893 sq. Locella on Xenophon of Ephesus, p. 213, coll. p. 160, ed. Peerlkamp. Valckenaer, Scholia on the New Testament I, p. 39, II, p. 209. For just as συνοικεῖν to cohabit is used chaste-ly regarding the union of spouses, so συνοικίζειν to give in marriage/settle together is used regarding a father, or one who is in the place of a father, bestowing a daughter; then, by metaphor, it is transferred to other types of union (Jacobs on Achilles Tatius 12, p. 433). The opposite is διοικίζειν to separate/divorce. Justin Martyr, Apology I, p. 313. A woman, with a bill of divorce offered to Caesar: "she requested that it be permitted to her to manage original: "διοικήσασθαι" — literally "to administer/manage," but here used to mean "settle her own affairs/be separated" her own affairs." I shall add a passage from Longinus, who, as a contemporary and friend of Plotinus, writes thus in On the Sublime XLIV. 7: "For luxury follows boundless wealth, joined and walking in equal step, as they say, and at the same time, as he opens the entrances of cities and houses, it enters and settles in." Therefore, in our passage, Ficinus ought rather to have translated lives together (or cohabits or is associated) than adheres.

— 14. τῷ δεσπότῃ with the master] Cf. ch. V. at the end.

p. 32, 1. αὐτοδικαιοσύνη self-justice/justice-itself] See critical note. The word αὐτοσωφροσύνη self-temperance/temperance-itself should be added to the Lexicons, and no less should αὐτοδικαιοσύνη be confirmed by this example. Proclus has αὐτοδίκαιον justice-itself in the first Alcibiades §. 40, p. 118, in our edition above, which passage should also be compared with ours for the sake of the argument.—Οἰκοπραγία doing one's own work in what follows flowed from Plato's Republic IV. 11, p. 434 sq., p. 192 ff., where the opposite is πολυπραγμοσύνη meddlesomeness/doing many things, and it also deals with justice. The whole passage, therefore, should be applied to ours.

— 8. ἡ εἴσω πρὸς νοῦν στροφὴ the inward turning toward the intellect] Marinus in the Life of Proclus 21, p. 51, p. 17: "For thinking was no longer for her, like the political [thinking], to act well regarding things that admit of change and to be otherwise, but rather to think purely by itself, and to be turned toward itself, in no way holding an opinion with the body," where Boissonade reminds us of our passage. Add Proclus in the first Alcibiades, p. 17 below and p. 21: "and to lead oneself back into the turning toward the better." But in particular, the entire fifty-fifth chapter of the same Marinus should be compared with our entire passage (p. 59, 60, p. 20), which is in some way transcribed from our passage; I shall not myself describe what Boissonade added there on p. 117 sq.

— 14. ἡ ἀϋλότης immateriality] This word must be added to the Lexicons. Hierocles and Proclus in Elements of Theology, ch. 197, use ἀϋλία immateriality. See ibid. note p. 294. A little later, δυνάμει in potentiality is to be distinguished from ἐνεργείᾳ in actuality; Plotinus treats this difference in a separate book, Ennead II, book 5.

p. 33, 11. τῆς φρονήσεως κινηθείσης when prudence has been moved] See the passage of Marinus from ch. 21 above, appended to ch. 5 at the end, and indeed to the word στροφὴ turning. Shortly after, περιστατικῶς circumstantially means as the occasion arises, as circumstances bring us around, which often present business and trouble, and consequently danger. See Upton in the Index to Epictetus on περιστασις circumstance, p. 421. Schweighäuser; Rhoer on Porphyry On Abstinence I. §. 55, p. 95. Gataker on M. Antoninus, p. 15 and p. 174; and Wyttenbach on Plutarch’s Moralia, p. 1025. Olympiodorus in the first Alcibiades, p. 77: "He receives here all the circumstantial [elements], such as the person, in what manner—in what land—at what time." Cf. below I. 4. 13, p. 37. B. ἐνέργειαι—περιστατικαί circumstantial activities.

p. 33, 18. πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς toward good men] Marinus in the Life of Proclus ch. 25, p. 59, p. 20: "And living altogether according to Plotinus, not the life of a man which the good man [lives], which political virtue deems worthy to be lived, but having left this behind, and having exchanged it for another, that of the gods; for to these, not to good men, is his assimilation." He seems to recite this passage from memory; for the manuscripts do not vary at all in the speech of Plotinus.