Plotini Opera Omnia cum Ficini commentariis

δαῖος earnest/serious. See Stephanus, Thesaurus p. 2192 C, D (London). Add Irmisch's Index to Herodian under the word. Joined in Stobaeus, Sermones Tit. 119, p. 446 (Gaisford). Wyttenbach on Plutarch, Consolatio ad Apollonium, Vol. II, Animadversiones p. 773, and Lobeck on Phrynichus p. 328 sqq.

p. 43, 3. ἀληθείας πεδίῳ plain of truth] Taken from Plato's Phaedrus ch. 28, p. 248: οὗ δὴ ἕνεχ’ ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ, τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὗ ἔστιν. For which sake there is much eagerness, to see the plain of truth where it is. See Hermias there; add Ast p. 306, and the references there to Axiochus p. 371 C; Plutarch De Oraculorum Defectu p. 422, Ps. p. 726 (Wytt.); Proclus on Plato's Timaeus p. 105. 4. Add Proclus on Platonic Theology IV, 6, p. 189.

ib. τῇ διαιρέσει τῇ Πλάτωνος by the division of Plato] Plato in the Statesman p. 262 A, B: μὴ σμικρὸν μόριον ἓν πρὸς πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀφαιρῶμεν, μηδὲ εἴδους χωρίς. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος ἅμα εἶδος ἐχέτω. Let us not take away one small part for many and great ones, nor without a form. But let the part have a form at the same time. καλλίον—δέ που καὶ μᾶλλον κατ’ εἴδη καὶ δίχα διαιροῖτ’ ἄν. It would be more beautiful and more according to forms and divided by two. Cf. 287 C; Sophist p. 266 A, B; Philebus p. 16 D, E; p. 17 A; p. 31 sqq. (Stallbaum). This passage of Plotinus is most essential for knowing Plato's Dialectic. Otherwise, see regarding this chapter of the Plotinian book, Holstenius's notes on Sallust's On the Gods and the World ch. I, p. 242 (Gal.), p. 70 (Orell.), and cited by him: Plato's Republic end of book V, and beginning of book VI; and Proclus in Platonic Theology book I, ch. 2.

— 9. λογικὴν πραγματείαν logical treatment] Logic discussion, naturally in the opinion of the Peripatetics, who first introduced the name λογικῆς logic. See Cicero, De Finibus I, 7, 22, 23, and Goerenz there. Cf. G. Vossius On Logic p. 206 sqq., and Wyttenbach's Precepts of Logical Philosophy, Prolegomena § 8, p. 6. [Add Facciolati, Institutes of Peripatetic Logic p. 13 sqq., and especially the same author's Rudiments of Logical Discipline p. 7 sqq.] Otherwise, with this whole description of Plotinian quietude, compare the twin passage of Proclus in Parmenides I, p. 47 (Cousin): ἑτέρα δὲ ἀναπαύουσα ἤδη τὸν νοῦν οἰκειοτάτῃ θεωρίᾳ τῶν ὄντων and another, already resting the mind with the most appropriate contemplation of beings, etc.; it is too long to be set down here.

ib. προτάσεων of propositions] See Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, 1, p. 79 (Sylb.): πρότασις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ λόγος καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικός, τινὸς κατά τινος a proposition, therefore, is an affirmative or negative statement, of something concerning something, etc. Cf. Posterior Analytics I, 2, p. 200. Suidas under πρότασις proposition III, p. 208 sq. (Kust.), where a dialectical proposition is distinguished from a problem; and Olympiodorus in

Plato's Alcibiades I, ch. 14, p. 123. Often it is the proposition of that which is proposed for dispute. Regarding the rhetorical proposition, see Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 3, 7, and the interpreters there, p. 64 (Oxon). Often, however, πρότασις proposition and προτάσεις propositions are read in Plotinus, as in IV, 4, 44; V, 5, 1; VI, 8, 3.

— 15. Εἶτα—συντίθησι Then—he puts together] Ficino, and Engelhardt and Taylor who followed him, make the soul the subject of this verb and the following ones. I determine nothing; I only ask whether it is not more convenient to consider Dialectic as the subject. Soon after: ἔστι γάρ, φησιν sc. ὁ Πλάτων for it is, says, namely, Plato. See the passages which we cited above in the annotations to the inscription of this book.

p. 44, 1. τί οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία; what then is philosophy?] For the opinion, consult Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 2, where he says of philosophy and this, p. 6 (ed. Sylb.): οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης (ἐπιστήμης) ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν. ἡ γὰρ θειοτάτη καὶ τιμιωτάτη. Nor is it necessary to think another (science) more honorable than such a one. For it is the most divine and most honorable. That Plotinus does not wish Dialectic to be an instrument of philosophy, but a part, and the most excellent one, is where he follows Plato. For thus he says in Republic VII, p. 534 end, p. 368 (Bekk.): Ἆρ’ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ὥσπερ θριγκὸς (apex, culmen. cf. Astii Comm. p. 574.) τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων; Ἔμοι γ’ ἔφη. "Does it therefore seem to you, I said, that just as a coping (apex, summit) Dialectic is placed for us above the mathematical studies, and no other study of this can rightly be placed higher, but the mathematical studies now have an end?" "It does to me," he said. What he adds immediately: οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἰητέον—καὶ κάνονες for one must not suppose—and rules, touches upon the Peripatetics and other philosophers who held Logic to be an instrument of Philosophy: compare the annotation above on the inscription of the book, and Ammonius's Preface to Aristotle's Categories. And in this place it is generally to be held that Plotinus does not call anything Philosophy except Platonic, and does not call anyone Philosophers except Platonists, or if someone of another sect should agree with the Platonists. This was pointed out before me by Wyttenbach, who praises many passages in these Enneads for this matter: p. 2 D, E; 6 G; 19 A, B; 20 C, F; our own passage likewise; then p. 203 F; 204 E; 212 F; 213 D; 291 A, C; 293 A; 325 C; 330 A; 423 D; 469 A; 556 A; 760 B. See Letters of the Socratic Companions of Philomathy ed. G. L. Mahne, Zierizee, 1813, p. 172 sq. To the words of our philosopher: ἀλλὰ περὶ πράγματά ἐστι—καὶ οἷον ὕλην ἔχει τὰ ὄντα but it is concerning things—and as it were has beings as matter, I can bring forth many things: let these from Plato's Sophist p. 254 A suffice: ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προ- but the philosopher, always occupying himself through reasonings with the idea of being, etc.