Plotini Opera Omnia cum Ficini commentariis

...I shall delay, the decrees of Aristotle, whom Plotinus also touches upon with other Peripatetics in this book, as Gennadius had sought to reduce the Plotinians to one in this matter. Indeed, Bandinius, in the Catalogue of Greek Codices of the Laurentian Library, Vol. III, p. 363, 370, 403, where he describes Codex number XXVII, states that in the same manuscript book there exists: Gennadius Scholarius (commonly called Georgius Scholarius) On Human Happiness: A Reconciliation of Aristotle and Plotinus original: "Περί ἀνθρωπίνης εὐδαιμονίας Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Πλωτίνου συμβιβαστικόν", De humana felicitate conciliatio Aristotelis et Plotini. Thomas Taylor published this book of Plotinus translated into English: Five Books of Plotinus. London, 1794, p. 3 sqq.
— 8. On Beatitude] Ficinus used the indulgence which Cicero, in On the Nature of the Gods I. 34, grants to those translating Greek with this substantive. But εὐδαιμονία happiness/blessedness is beatitas or beatitudo, or the Blessed; which Cicero also uses substantively (Goerenz to De Finibus, p. 637): εὐτυχία good fortune, Felicity, and εὐτυχὴς fortunate properly means lucky, as opposed to ὄλβιος prosperous/blissful, just as εὐδαίμων happy/blessed, blessed. See Herodotus I. 32; Eustathius on the Odyssey VI. 187; Valckenaer on Theocritus Adoniazusae v. 24. The same to Euripides' Hippolytus 750, and Elmsley on Medea 1197. For the usage of philosophers' speech, consult Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VII. 13. 4, and his interpreters on I. 4. 2.
— 11. ἐν εὐζωΐᾳ—εἶναι to be in a good life/well-being] Aristot. Nicom. Ethics I. 8. 4: "It accords with the argument that the blessed man also lives well and acts well, for it is almost said to be a kind of well-being and well-doing." Cf. Thom. Gataker on Marcus Antoninus III. 12, p. 87. The Stoic in Stobaeus (Eclogues II. 7, p. 171, p. 130 sqq. Heeren) also uses this substantive twice, which place Wyttenbach (on Plutarch's Consolatio ad Apollonium, p. 739 sq., ed. min.) correctly vindicated from Heeren's changes and recalled to Canter's method. Otherwise, cf. below, ch. 14, and Proclus in Alcibiades p. 100, at the end, and the Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax, ibid., p. 332, last line.
— 15. οἷον καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ τῶν ζώων—τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει just as musical animals also... have life] If you think of ἐνδέχοιτο it might be possible again, the reading ἔχειν to have is not bad, which could easily have been corrupted by scribes who did not think of this. Aristotle also professes that some animals are delighted by song (Politics VIII. 6. 4); Plutarch, Symposiacs book VII, Probl. 5, ch. 2, p. 704 sq., p. 902 Wytt.

But it seems to me that Aristotle does not have a just reason for absolving pleasures related to sight and hearing from intemperance, as if they were the only human ones. For the others, even beasts have the nature to use and share in them. We see that many irrational things are charmed by music, just as deer are charmed by pipes, etc. Cf. Gellius, Attic Nights XIX. 2; Muret on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III. 10. 7, p. 110 sq.; Zeller and Gerard Vossius on Music § 11, p. 14. Just as the construction varies in this period, so it is no less so in the following αὐτοῖς ἀφικνουμένων arriving for them (thus we have corrected it, or you may prefer ἀφικομένων having arrived). After this word, we placed a major punctuation mark, deleting the comma after ἐλθοῦσιν having come, following Ficinus and Engelhardt.
p. 56, 7. ζωὴν ἐξελιττομένην εἰς τέλος ἔχουσι they possess life unfolding toward an end] Elegantly said of plants, which, by maturing, unfold more and more. Concerning the various uses of the verb, I add to those things that learned men have gathered in H. Stephens' Thesaurus, Zonaras' Lexicon p. 771, and Jacobs on Callistratus' Statues p. 728. Plotinus uses it frequently. See, for example, III. 7. 5, III. 7. 10, III. 8. 7, IV. 8. 6, V. 3. 3, VI. 8. 18, and ἐξέλιξις unfolding/evolution V. 7. 3. In the following, Ficinus did not express that καὶ μὴ and not after ἐπὶ—εὖ παθεῖν to fare well, although it appears in one Medicean codex. Yet it is clearer: "to fare well, and not, and fruit again..." Regarding the subject of this entire passage, there are the things our philosopher argues elsewhere about animals and plants, such as III. 4. 2, p. 283 sq.; III. 8. 1, p. 344; and IV. 4. 27 sq., p. 419 sqq., and what Marsilius has placed here and there in his Commentaries, for example, in this very book p. 22, 23, 27, and p. 340, where he also speaks occasionally of the sex of plants. Porphyry, On Abstinence I, sect. 18, says hesitatingly: "If, as they say, plants also have a soul," which was the opinion of the Egyptians, see Rhoer on the cited passage, p. 30. The same, III. 19, p. 258: "However, to compare plants to animals is altogether violent; for the latter are by nature capable of feeling, suffering pain, fearing, and being harmed; therefore they can be wronged; but for the former there is nothing perceptible," etc. Cf. III. 27, p. 287. Proclus argues for a different opinion in Fragments on Sacrifice and Magic, p. 274 sqq., ed. Lugd. Tornæs. 1549, which places Jo. Bapt. Pius touched upon in Gruter's Lampas, Vol. I, p. 553.
— 14. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὸ τέλος κ. τ. λ. If, therefore, pleasure is the end, etc.] Thus Eudoxus, Aristippus, Epicurus, and others. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X. 2. 1, p. 434 (Zeller); Stobaeus, Eclogues II. 7, p. 74 (Heeren); Xenophon, Memorabilia II. 1, III. 8; Diogenes Laërtius II. 65; Cicero, Academics (IV) II. 42. 131: "Others wished pleasure to be the end: the prince of whom was Aristippus, who had heard Socrates; whence the Cyrenaics. Afterward Epicurus, whose discipline is now better known: yet he does not agree with the Cyrenaics concerning pleasure itself." Cf. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I. 40, and Davis there, and our annotations p. 181 sqq.