Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato

...the intelligible part of it. Both are also indigent Meaning "dependent" or "lacking." In this philosophical context, if something is indigent, it cannot be the ultimate starting point of the universe because it relies on something else to exist. of each other, since possession is always accompanied by this lack, in the same manner as the world is always present with matter. Hence, a certain dependency is naturally coessentiallized Built into the very essence or "being" of a thing. with the intellect, so that it cannot be the most proper first principle.

Shall we, therefore, next direct our attention to the most simple of beings, which Plato calls the one being original: "ἓν ὄν" (hen on)? For since there is no separation there throughout the Whole, nor any multitude, or order, or doubling, or conversion to itself The ability of a consciousness to turn inward and be aware of itself; here, the author argues that the "one being" is so unified it doesn't even have the "two-ness" required for self-reflection., what dependency could appear to me in that which is perfectly united? And especially, what dependency would there be on that which is lower than it? Hence, the great Parmenides A pre-Socratic philosopher who argued that reality is a single, unchanging "One." ascended to this most safe principle as that which is the most self-sufficient.

Is it not, however, necessary here to attend to the conception of Plato: that the "united" is not the One itself, but that which is passive [2] to it? In this sense, "passive" means "receiving" or "acted upon." The "united" thing is not unity itself; it is a thing that has been made one by a higher power. Since this is the case, it is evident that the "one being" ranks after the One; for it is supposed to be that which is made one, and not the One itself. Also, if being is composed from the elements of limit (the bound) and infinity, as appears from the Philebus of Plato—where he calls it "that which is mixed"—it will be dependent on its own elements.

Besides, if the concept of "being" is different from the concept of "being united," and the "Whole" is both united and being, these parts will depend on each other, and the whole called the one being is dependent on the two. And though the One in this mix is better than "being," the One still needs "being" in order for the one being to exist. But if "being" here comes upon the One like a form—much like the specific quality of "man" comes upon the collection of "rational-mortal-animal"—then the One will be dependent on "being."

If, however, to speak more properly, the One is two-fold: this "One" being the cause of the mixture and existing before being, while that "One" provides the rightness or structure to being—if this be the case, even this nature is not perfectly free from dependency.

After all these, it may be said that the One itself will be perfectly self-sufficient. For it does not need that which comes after itself for its existence, since the truly One is by itself separated from all things. Nor does it need anything inferior or more excellent within itself, for there is nothing in it besides itself; nor is it in want of itself. But it is One because it has no "doubleness" within itself. For not even the relation of "itself to itself" must be asserted of the truly One, since it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most self-sufficient of all things.

Hence, this is the principle and the cause of all, and this is at once the first of all things. If these qualities, however, are present with it, will it truly be the One? Or may we not say that all things exist in the One according to the nature of the One? And that both these qualities exist in it, along with such other things as we say of it—for instance, that it is the most simple, the most excellent, the most powerful, the preserver of all things, and the Good itself?

If these things are true of the One, it will also be "indigent" of the things that come after it, according to those very titles we give to it. For a "principle" is only called a principle because of the things that proceed from it; a "cause" is only a cause of the things it causes; and the "first" is only the first of the things arranged after it [3].

[2] See the Sophist of Plato, where this is asserted.

[3] For a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the existence of the things of which it is the principle or cause. Hence, insofar as it is a principle or cause, it will be dependent on the existence of those things.

Further still, the "simple" exists in contrast to the complexity of other things; the "most powerful" is named according to its power in relation to those subject to it; and "the Good," "the Desirable," and "the Preserver" are so called with reference to the things benefited, preserved, and desiring.

And if it should be said to be "all things" because it contains the seeds of all things within itself, it will be so according to the One alone. It will be the "one cause" of all things prior to all, and will be this and no other, according to the One.

So far, therefore, as it is the One alone, it will be self-sufficient; but so far as it is self-sufficient, it will be the first principle and stable root of all principles. However, so far as it is the principle and first cause of all things, and is set up as the object of desire for all things, it appears to be in a certain respect dependent on the things to which it relates. It has therefore—if it be lawful to speak this way—an ultimate vestige A trace or footprint; the smallest possible amount. of dependency, just as, on the contrary, matter has an ultimate echo of self-sufficiency, or a most obscure and debile Weak or feeble. impression of the One.

And here, language itself appears to be subverted. For so far as it is the One, it is also self-sufficient, since the principle has appeared to exist according to the most self-sufficient and the One. At the same time, however, so far as it is the One, it is also the principle; and so far as it is the One, it is self-sufficient, but so far as...