Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato

Damascius A Neoplatonist philosopher (c. 458 – after 538 AD) who was the last head of the School of Athens. asserted indeed, that there is one superessential From the Greek 'hyperousios', meaning 'beyond being' or 'above essence'; existing at a level higher than the concept of existence itself. God, but that the other gods had an essential subsistence, and were deified by illuminations from the one. They likewise said that there is a multitude of super–essential unities, who are not self–perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity, imparted to essences by the highest Gods. That this hypothesis, however, is not conformable to the doctrine of Plato is evident from his Parmenides, in which he shows that the one does not subsist in itself. (See vol. iii, p. 133). For as we have observed from Proclus A major Greek Neoplatonist philosopher (412–485 AD) known for his systematic commentaries on Plato., in the notes on that Dialogue, every thing which is the cause of itself and is self–subsistent, is said to be in itself. Hence as producing power always comprehends, according to cause that which it produces, it is necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is caused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, that which comprehends, and that which is comprehended. If therefore a subsistence in another signifies, according to Plato, the being produced by another more excellent cause (as we have shown in the note to p. 133, vol. iii), a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self–begotten, and produced by itself. If the one therefore is not self–sub–sistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be necessary that there should be something self–subsistent, it follows that this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately proceeds from the ineffable That which is too great or extreme to be expressed or described in words.. But that there must be something self–subsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not be a true sufficiency in any thing.

Besides, as Damascius well observes, if that which is subordinate by nature is self–perfect, such as the human soul, much more will this be the case with a divine soul. But if with soul, this also will be true of intellect. And if it be true of intellect, it will also be true of life: if of life, of being likewise; and if of being, of the unities above being. For the self–perfect, the self–sufficient, and that which is established in itself, will much more subsist in superior than in subordinate natures. If therefore, these are in the latter, they will also be in the former. I mean the subsistence of a thing by itself, and essentialized in itself; and such are essence and life, intellect, soul, and body. For body, though it does not subsist from, yet subsists by itself; and through this belongs to the genus of substance, and is contra–distinguished from accident, which cannot exist independent of a subject.

Self–subsistent superessential natures therefore are the immediate progeny of the one, if it be lawful thus to denominate things, which ought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the ineffable; for progeny implies a producing cause, and the one must be conceived as something even more excellent than this. From this divine self–perfect and self–producing multitude, a series of self–perfect natures, viz. of beings, lives, intellects, and souls proceeds, according to Plato, in the last link of which luminous series he also classes the human soul; proximately suspended from the daemoniacal order In Platonism, 'daemons' (from 'daimon') are not evil spirits, but intermediate beings that bridge the gap between gods and humans.: for this order, as he clearly asserts in the Banquet The 'Banquet' refers to Plato's dialogue the 'Symposium'., “stands in the middle rank between the divine and human, fills up the vacant space, and links together all intelligent nature.” And here to the reader, who has not penetrated the depths of Plato's philosophy, it will doubtless appear paradoxical in the extreme, that any being should be said to produce itself, and yet at the same time proceed from a superior cause. The solution of this difficulty is as follows:—Essential production, or that energy through which any nature produces something else by its very being, is the most perfect mode of production, because vestiges of it are seen in the last of things; thus fire imparts heat, by its very essence, and snow coldness. And in short, this is a producing of that kind, in which the effect is that secondarily which the cause is primarily. As this mode of production therefore, from its being the most perfect of all others, originates from the highest natures, it will consequently first belong to those self–subsistent powers, who immediately proceed from the ineffable, and will from them be derived to all the following orders of beings. But this energy, as being characterized by the essential, will necessarily be different in different producing causes. Hence, from that which subsists, at the summit of self subsistent natures, a series of self subsisting beings will indeed proceed, but then this series will be secondarily that which its cause is primarily, and the energy by which it produces itself will be secondary to that by which it is produced by its cause. Thus, for instance, the rational soul both produces itself (in consequence of being a self–motive A core Platonic concept: the soul is defined by its ability to move itself, unlike physical objects which must be moved by something else. nature), and is produced by intellect; but it is produced by intellect immutably, and by itself transitively; for all its energies subsist in time, and are accompanied with motion. So far therefore as soul contains intellect by participation, so far it is produced by intellect, but so far as it is self–motive it is