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and supposing that he actually did so, I should remain none the less convinced of the falsity of his assertion, and although his miracle might arouse my astonishment, it would not instil any doubt into my belief. The author argues that even a supernatural event, like turning a stone into gold, cannot overturn a self-evident mathematical truth.
I then understood that all forms of knowledge which do not unite these conditions (imperviousness to doubt, etc.) do not deserve any confidence, because they are not beyond the reach of doubt, and what is not impregnable to doubt cannot constitute certitude.
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his knowledge?
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Saint
Augus-
tine
I then examined what knowledge I possessed, and discovered that in none of it, with the exception of sense-perceptions and necessary principles term: necessary principles fundamental logical truths, such as "the whole is greater than the part", did I enjoy that degree of certitude which I have just described. I then sadly reflected as follows: “We cannot hope to find truth—except in matters which carry their evidence in themselves—that is to say, in sense-perceptions and necessary principles; we must therefore establish these on a firm basis. Is my absolute confidence in sense-perceptions and on the infallibility of necessary principles analogous to the confidence which I formerly possessed in matters believed on the authority of others? Is it only analogous to the reliance most people place on