CONTENTS

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . xi
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . 1
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. On the division of Philosophy . . . . . . 7
II. On the realm of Philosophy in general . . . . . 11
III. On the Critique of Judgment as a means of combining
the two parts of Philosophy into a whole . . . . 14
IV. On Judgment as a faculty legislating a priori original: "a priori"; meaning "from the earlier," referring to knowledge that proceeds from theoretical deduction rather than from observation or experience. . . . . 17
V. The principle of the formal purposiveness The quality of appearing to have been designed for a purpose, even if that purpose is not known. of nature
is a transcendental principle of Judgment . . . . 20
VI. On the combination of the feeling of pleasure with
the concept of the purposiveness of nature . . . . 27
VII. On the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness
of nature . . . . . . . . . . 30
VIII. On the logical representation of the purposiveness of
nature . . . . . . . . . . 35
IX. On the connection of the legislation of Understanding
with that of Reason by means of the Judgment . . . 39
FIRST PART.—CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGMENT . . 43
First Division.—Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgment . . 45
First Book.—Analytic of the Beautiful . . . . . 45
First Moment of the judgment of taste, according to quality . 45
§ 1. The judgment of taste is aesthetical . . . . 45
§ 2. The satisfaction which determines the judgment of
taste is disinterested Free from personal bias or the desire for possession; purely contemplative. . . . . . . . 46
§ 3. The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with
interest . . . . . . . . . . 48
§ 4. The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest . 50