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C. The Judgment of Necessity In this stage of logic, the relationship between the subject and predicate is no longer perceived as accidental, but as essential or required by law. — p. 111 — 122.
a. the categorical p. 112.
b. the hypothetical p. 113.
c. the disjunctive p. 116.
D. The Judgment of the Concept Here, the judgment evaluates whether an individual object corresponds to its own essential nature (its "Concept"). p. 122 — 131.
a. the assertoric p. 124.
b. the problematic p. 126.
c. the apodictic p. 128.
The Syllogism German: Der Schluß. In traditional logic, this is the formal process of inference (e.g., All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal). For Hegel, it represents the "truth" of the Judgment, where different terms are unified through a mediating middle term. p. 132 — 191.
A. The Syllogism of Existence German: Daseyn. The most basic form of syllogism, where terms are linked based on their immediate qualities. p. 135 — 165.
a. first figure p. 136.
b. second figure p. 148.
c. third figure p. 153.
d. fourth figure p. 155.
Note: The common view of the syllogism p. 158.
B. The Syllogism of Reflection p. 165 — 178.
a. Syllogism of Allness p. 167.
b. of Induction p. 170.
c. of Analogy p. 173.
C. The Syllogism of Necessity p. 179 — 191.
a. the categorical p. 180.
b. the hypothetical p. 183.
c. the disjunctive syllogism p. 187.