The Logic of Hegel

In the work of Hegel, however, we find a completely different method of working. The aids mentioned previously Referring to the familiar mental images and analogies used in other sciences to help students understand new concepts. are missing; and until we realize that they are not even necessary, the Hegelian theory will remain a locked mystery. What appears at first glance to be a riddle is actually the clear and direct expression of thought. Instead of searching for metaphors or familiar names, we must simply accept the various terms and stages in the development of thought as they arise. These concepts only need to be grasped on their own terms. They do not need to be illustrated or explained by our past experiences.

Ordinary knowledge involves placing a new object into a category—connecting it to a generalized image we already know. It is not so much true discovery as it is recognition.

"‘What is the truth?’ asked Lady Chettam of Mrs. Cadwallader in Middlemarch A famous novel by George Eliot, published in 1871–1872.. ‘The truth? He is as bad as the wrong medicine original: "physic," a common term for medicine in the 19th century—nasty to take, and sure to disagree.’ ‘There could not be anything worse than that,’ said Lady Chettam, with so vivid a conception of the medicine that she seemed to have learned something exact about Mr. Casaubon’s disadvantages."

Once we have assigned a new individual to a familiar category or a handy metaphor, once we have given it a name and welcomed it into the "social circle" of our minds, we feel satisfied. We have filed away a new object in its proper drawer in our mental filing cabinet; then, with a collector's pride, we can comfortably call it our own. But this kind of familiarity, based on a mix of memory and naming, is not true knowledge in the strict sense of the word “What is familiar is not understood precisely because it is familiar.” (original: “Das Bekannte überhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist, nicht erkannt.”) Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (original: Phänomenologie des Geistes), p. 24.. "What is he? Do you know him?" These are our questions, and we are satisfied when we learn his name and his profession. We might never have truly understood the inner nature of these objects, even though we are so familiar with their overall appearance original: tout ensemble or general outlines that we imagine we understand them completely.