Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences

V

it would have been more advantageous for the work itself in the eyes of the public, if circumstances had permitted me to precede it with a more detailed treatment of the other parts of philosophy, similar to the work on the first part of the whole—logic—which I have already presented to the public.

I believe, moreover, that although in the present presentation the aspect concerning the content of representation German: Vorstellung; refers to the way the mind forms images or concepts of things and empirical acquaintance Knowledge gained through sensory experience rather than pure reason had to be restricted, I have nonetheless made enough noted regarding the transitions—which can only be a mediation occurring through the concept German: Begriff; a central term in this philosophy referring to the self-developing rational essence of a thing—that the methodical nature of the progression will be sufficiently distinguished both from the merely external order sought by the other sciences, and from a manner used in philosophical dis—