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original: "Physicorum"; likely a commentary on Aristotle's Physics.
...and it is never the case that one is simultaneously under grace and, in some respect, under sin, just as in a change from white to black, there is the interception of a middle color The author is arguing that certain spiritual transitions are absolute, unlike physical changes (like color) which pass through intermediate stages.. And similarly, this concept of time applies to the motion of an angel, insofar as we say that angels move in time and understand in time, according to the discourse of angelic intelligence over things that can be understood in evening knowledge. I say "in evening knowledge" original: "cognitione uespertina"; in medieval theology, this refers to the knowledge angels have of things as they exist in their own created nature. because, according to morning knowledge original: "cognitionem matutinam"; the knowledge angels have of things as they exist eternally within God., they reach eternity. And this motion of both the soul and the angel is measured by a successive now original: "nunc uicissitudinatū", insofar as the soul or angel moves from one object of understanding to another; and every such act of it is perfect. And this is what Augustine says: "That God moves the bodily creature through time and place, but the spiritual creature through time only." For in this kind of time, it is not inconsistent for there to be no immediate successor to the "now" without an intervening gap. It should also be noted that time is more the cause of decay than of coming-into-being original: "plus cā corruptionis q̃ generationis" because of the change it measures, which causes a thing to distance itself from its beginning; for that which grows old and ages is near its end. Let these remarks on time suffice.
Since we have spoken of time, which is the measure of temporal things, we must now speak of eternity, which is the measure of eternal things, and of the aeon original: "euo" or "aevum"; in medieval philosophy, this is a third type of duration specifically for created spirits like angels, sitting between the "time" of the physical world and the "eternity" of God., which is the measure of "everlasting" original: "euiternoꝝ" things. For there are some things, as it is said in the Book of Causes original: "lib. de causis"; a widely studied Neoplatonic text in the Middle Ages., whose substance and action are in time, such as "lower nature"—that is, that whose being exists through the process of birth and becoming [generation]. Some things, however, are those whose substance and action are above time, such as the "supreme nature"—namely, God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Truly, there are some things whose substance is above time, but whose action is in time, such as "middle nature," whose being exists through creation This refers to human souls or angels, who are created at a specific point but then exist forever.. A fourth category cannot exist, for in that case, the action of a thing would exist before its substance, which is impossible.
Furthermore, these three measures are understood in relation to duration. For there is a type of duration having both a beginning and an end, such as time. There is another having neither beginning nor end, such as eternity. And there is a third having a beginning but no end, such as the aeon [evum]. Again, a fourth category cannot exist, for everything that has an end must also have a beginning.
Boethius defines eternity in this way in the book The Consolation of Philosophy original: "lib. de cōse." (De Consolatione Philosophiae) near the end: "Eternity is the total, simultaneous, and perfect possession of an unending life." This definition can be explained as follows: "possession" is common to every measure, for every measure is "possessed" by that which it measures as its own proper attribute. By using the phrase "of an unending life," he touches upon the subject of eternity itself—namely, the eternal God, who has neither beginning nor end—though this subject is not distinct from eternity except in our logical understanding original: "secūdū rōnēm"; conceptually distinct but essentially the same in reality.. And he says "of life" rather than "of being" in order to establish a difference from those things which exist in the eternity of punishments, which do not possess a blessed or joyful life. For "life," though it can be used in a general sense for any kind of living, is here specifically used to mean a joy...