Ramon Llull Ars Inventiua Veritatis (1515)

First Distinction.

These are the causative principles of lower things: just as in lower things the end original: "finis"; refers to the purpose or goal of a thing. is a principle because it moves matter, and the form itself is similarly a principle because it informs matter; for this reason, even matter is a principle because, by its nature of "passion" In scholastic philosophy, "passion" refers to the capacity to be acted upon or to receive a form., it gives birth to existence along with the form's nature of action, and together they constitute the suppositum A "suppositum" is a distinct, individual subject or self-subsisting thing, such as a specific person or a specific stone.. There are also other accidental principles: such as time, quantity, quality, and the like. For without these, form and matter cannot reach the constitution of a suppositum, nor can there be generation or corruption, nor could matter be a principle resisting its own form. Once the knowledge of the highest principle, the lowest principle, and their conditions is gained, the Artist has direction for finding the "middle" of this conclusion regarding the principle of Aristotle. Therefore, by reason of this kind of knowledge, it is necessary for the principle properly so-called to be included along with the other principles in this Art.

¶ Concerning the Middle. (F.)

The Middle original: "Medium" is the very form through which the end flows to the beginning, and through which the beginning flows back to the end. By its very nature, it shares the flavor of both. For this reason, the Middle looks toward the beginning and the end in eight ways. Because just as no beginning exists without an end, so also nothing has a middle without an end. Thus, for these things, the middle is not without an end, nor consequently without a beginning. Hence, the middle is a certain being composed of the likeness of two very different things: namely, its beginning and its end. Therefore, the middle is the image of its beginning and its end, in which one considers the transition from beginning to end, and through which the influence comes from the end to the beginning, as was said.

That specific Middle is the beginning, middle, and end of all other middles, in which and with which the beginning and end are the same in essence and in the nature of goodness, magnitude, and other such qualities. Indeed, no other middles can be supreme or lowest without this condition; their goodness, magnitude, duration, and so on are greater in the middle than in the beginning, and greater in the end than in the beginning and middle. Nor can they be at their highest in the end, because they are produced as likenesses toward the end. But they are also taken where they are multiple, because they have multiple modes of being.

There is also a middle of conjunction, which joins diverse or distinct things into one; such as the power which, proceeding from form and matter, joins that form and that matter into one subject of being, so that it is the center and the principle for the others, and the being itself is their end. There is also a middle of measurement: like a point in the middle of a line equally distant from the ends, or like the center in the middle of a circle equally distant from every part of the building, or like time in goodness, quantity in magnitude, and so on for others. There is similarly a middle of extremities, like a line existing in the middle of its two ends, or like that which encloses the whole within the proper surface of some species, or like goodness continuing the whole middle even to the ultimate reaches of divine magnitude, duration, power, justice, etc., or the concordance of the beginning, middle, and end, or of majority, equality, minority, etc.

This principle which we call the Middle is very necessary in this Art. For when the Artist has knowledge of the conditions of the supreme, middle, and lowest, they will know how to reach, in action, a proportionate middle between the begin-

-ning and the end of that principle, as the power of the principle passes through its middle to its end.

¶ Concerning the End. (G.)

The End original: "Finis" is that in which the principle rests. And since there are different ends taken in different respects, they must be considered with their differences. For one is the causal end (of which we have already spoken at the beginning). Another is the end of termination, such as the boundaries of a path, or of a body, or of some quantity, beyond which the thing terminated does not proceed; and likewise, the boundaries of the intellect, beyond which understanding does not proceed. There is also another end of privation, which by reason of corruption causes a being to finish in non-being—that is, to cease from being.

The aforementioned "causative end" is very necessary; for without it, no being could exist in the essence of goodness, magnitude, duration, etc. Similarly, regarding other things, there is one end after another, ascending from end to end until the final infinite end, beyond which no end is possible. This end, by reason of its infinity of essence and goodness, etc., exists as the end in itself and through its own nature, not needing any external cause for its boundaries. This end is the supreme one toward which all other ends are directed and which all beings desire.

Furthermore, this aforementioned end has its own infinite boundaries, namely infinite goodness, infinite magnitude, etc., by which all other beings are encompassed and terminated, even more than a thing contained is within its container. It has simply within itself its own intrinsic operation, so that its goodness and magnitude are not idle, nor do they exist without a goal. Under this end are all other lower ends (as has been said), in which the human intellect contemplates the highest and ultimate end. This principle, which is the End, is very necessary in this Art; for the Artist, having knowledge of its conditions, has a way to find the middle of the principle needed for the solution of inquiries. For if they must recur to the supreme end, they should look to the conditions it has in highest goodness and magnitude by reason of that supreme end. If, however, they look to a lower end, they must similarly recur to the conditions it has in lower goodness, and the same follows for the ends of termination and privation.

¶ Concerning Majority. (H.)

Majority original: "Maioritas"; in this context, it refers to greatness, superiority, or being "more" in quality or quantity. is the image of the immensity of magnitude, goodness, and so on. We must consider Majority both substantially and accidentally.

Substantial Majority is when one substance is greater than another in goodness, etc., out of which the substance itself is constituted; just as the substance of the heavens is greater than the substance of fire, and the substance of the soul is greater than the substance of the heavens. Majority is also found between substance and accident In Aristotelian terms, a "substance" is a thing that exists in itself (like a tree), while an "accident" is a quality that exists only in a substance (like the greenness of the tree)., because substance is simply greater than an accident by reason of the goodness, etc., from which it has its being. Truly, by reason of the "end," Majority is found in certain accidents over certain substances; for instance, "understanding" and "loving," which in their goodness as an end, are greater than a donkey or a stone. And just as one substance is greater than another (as was said), so also one accident is greater than another by reason of its goodness and magnitude—