Fo. VIII

...and .d. of the third circle, the lowest under .c. of the second, so that a chamber original: "camera"; in Lullian logic, a 'chamber' or 'cell' is the logical space created by the intersection of two or more principles. of b c d is formed. And because these letters signify in the first figure, their meanings should be taken in the sense of the second figure, which are described by those same letters. And this happens if they fall under b, d, q through a, b, c, d of the first figure. But if they relate more to b c d of the second figure, let the meanings of those b, c, d of the second be received into the meanings of those b, c, d of the first. The same follows in its own way for e, f, g, etc. Also, if they fall under b, d, q, it must be acted upon in a similar manner to what has been said, reducing them by reason of consequence, coordinating the other eight chambers to the first, and reconciling them with one another and with the first. And then it must be concluded that the conditions of each of those figures in the second distinction remain whole and unharmed. For it is to them that one must recur, and according to their suitability, a conclusion must be reached. ¶ But if the artist requires a multiplication of arguments, let him turn the circles; for their revolution changes the terms. When these are changed, let him take the meaning of their significations. For example, if he first had

b c d and c d e, etc., let him turn the last circle by one chamber and he will have b c e and c d f, etc. Their meanings are different and their conditions are different from the first ones, yet they are artificially reducible to the same or to the opposite of that same grouping. Hence, through the first adaptation, the artist can elicit nine arguments, and through the second, multiply nine others, and through the third, another nine, and so on until he necessarily returns to the first one he formed. Thus, through this Art, a great multitude of arguments flows forth. In this way, therefore, he has an abundance of arguments for each part of a condition. Nevertheless, those arguments—which, whether affirmatively or negatively, fortify a part by preserving some appearance—seem to belong to the second distinction of the conditions of this Art; yet not all of them are according to the essence and conditions of all the principles of this Art, which are to be investigated regarding their solutions in the meanings of the chambers.

Alphabet of this Art

The Second Distinction Begins

By adding each of the terms of this Art, certain conditions The "conditions" are the logical states or properties that arise when two principles interact. of this Art result, which we intend to pursue in this following distinction. We elicit three conditions from each combination or "chamber" implicitly in three propositions, by changing each principle from one to another according to the process. In the chamber of Goodness and Greatness, therefore, we explicitly ordain sixteen conditions. The first of these is elicited from the nature of Great Eternal Goodness; the second, from the nature of Great Powerful Goodness; the third, from the nature of Great Wise Goodness, and so on for the others. Similarly, from the chamber of Great Eternity, fifteen conditions are held, the first of which is the nature of Great Eternal Power; the second, the nature of Great Eternal Wisdom; the third, the nature of Great Eternal Will, and so on. ¶ The reason for this process is this: that the artist may recur to the chambers of the 3rd or 4th figures when he needs means to solve the questions proposed to him, or to destroy or distinguish arguments contrary to the truth. If perhaps he does not know how to elicit the middle term The "middle term" (medium) is the logical bridge in a syllogism that connects the subject to the predicate. from these, let him recur to the definitions and conditions of the principles of this Art in the first, second, and third distinctions, applying them to the terms of the question, and he will find them. If, however, he applies the question to some condition and does not find the purpose, let him inquire in another until he has it. Or if perhaps that condition to which the application is made

is too restricted to a specific [case] so that it does not serve the purpose of this inquiry, let a new condition of the principles of this Art be made according to the proposal, following the order of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd distinctions, looking at the similarity or dissimilarity of that condition in which he believed the proposition was to be found. And thus the middle term for the conclusion is discoverable. ¶ Moreover, the application of the terms of a question happens in three ways: namely, explicitly, implicitly, or both. Explicitly or properly when the question contains some terms of this Art; for example, if one asks "whether Goodness and Greatness can be numerically the same." Then the middle term enters into the chamber or the conditions of Great Powerful Goodness, and so on for all other chambers in which mention is made of Goodness, Greatness, or Power. In the same way, it is to be understood regarding the individual principles of this Art if they occur in that manner. Implicitly, for example: "whether Divine Justice, in justifying, profits anything in itself." Then Justice and Perfection are to be applied to those principles of this Art through which they can be better and more easily explained, such as to Great Powerful Goodness or to Great Wise Goodness, and to Justice and Perfection or any other. And the application is made in both ways similarly when the terms of the question fall into the principles of this Art partly explicitly and partly implicitly; as if one asks "whether the created will is God." Then that which is implicit must be made explicit as has been said through the explicit terms of this Art, until they assume the Goodness, Greatness, etc., of God and the creature, and are applied to the Will and its conditions. And from this and about this, general instruction has been given in the questions; and to this the definitions and...