On the Mysteries (De Mysteriis)

temporally. Accidents accidentia: traits that are not essential to a thing's nature, such as being "tall" or "near," which can change without the thing itself changing belong to composite things and to forms that exist within a subject In philosophy, a "subject" is the physical matter or underlying thing that carries properties, but they do not apply to immaterial forms. Whatever exists in separable forms formae separabiles: pure spiritual patterns or entities that exist independently of physical matter is [pure] being, and is essential in a singular and perhaps equal way. Neither accident nor consequence is found there. Movements and actions differ because of the differences in their natures, not the other way around. If we were to say that there is only one genus genus: a general category or "kind" in logic, like "animal" or "planet" for these separate beings, we would confuse theology original: theologia; for Neoplatonists, "theology" was the rational study of the gods and the divine hierarchy. Separable substances do not coincide in one certain genus within which they might be distinguished by specific differences; rather, they are distinguished by themselves and by the order of their ranks, insofar as they are related to the First The "First" refers to the Neoplatonic "One" or God, the ultimate source of all existence through various degrees of perfection. Moreover, those agree more among themselves which are related in a more similar manner to the First and the Last. The Good is twofold: that which is above essence In this philosophy, the ultimate Good (God) is so perfect that it exists even above the level of "being" or "essence" and that which is according to essence. Essence essentia: the core "what-ness" or fundamental nature of a being is the property of all the Gods. But the Good itself is above essence and is called the cause of good—namely, the principle of essential good. Therefore, the ranks of the Gods are distinguished from one another according to their degrees of essence. In the lowest rational souls animae rationales: the human soul, which possesses reason but is at the bottom of the spiritual hierarchy, essential good is not present as it is in the gods; instead, they possess a participation in the good according to intellectual beauty, though this is present in them immovably.