A Treatise of Human Nature - Volume 2

counter, one annihilates the other as far as its strength goes, and only the remainder of the superior passion continues to operate upon the mind. But in the present case, neither of the passions could ever become superior. Supposing it was only the view of ourselves that excited them, that view—being perfectly indifferent to either—must produce both in the exact same proportion; or in other words, it can produce neither. To excite any passion while simultaneously raising an equal share of its antagonist is to immediately undo what was done, leaving the mind perfectly calm and indifferent in the end.

We must, therefore, make a distinction between the cause and the object Hume distinguishes between the "cause" (the thing that triggers the feeling, like a beautiful house) and the "object" (the person the feeling is about—the self). of these passions—between the idea that excites them and the idea toward which they direct their view once excited. Pride and humility, once raised, immediately turn our attention to ourselves and regard that as their ultimate and final object. However, something else is required to raise them: something which is unique to one of the passions and does not produce both in the same degree. The first idea presented to the mind is that of the cause or productive principle The underlying trigger or origin of the emotion.. This excites the pas-