A Treatise of Human Nature - Volume 3

no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. It is impossible, therefore, that they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason.

the distinction between

THIS argument is of double advantage to our present purpose. For it proves directly that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it; and it proves the same truth more indirectly by showing us that, as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence. Actions may be laudable or blameworthy; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable: Laudable or blameworthy, therefore, are not the same as reasonable or unreasonable. The merit and demerit of actions frequently contradict, and sometimes control, our natural propensities. But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.

BUT perhaps it may be said that, though no will or action can be immediately contradictory to reason, yet we may find such a