A Treatise of Human Nature - Volume 3

contradiction in some of the circumstances attending the action—that is, in its causes or effects. The action may cause a judgment, or may be indirectly caused by one, when the judgment concurs with a passion; and by an improper way of speaking, which philosophy will hardly allow, the same contradiction may, on that account, be attributed to the action. It will now be appropriate to consider how far this truth or falsehood may be the source of morals.

IT has been observed that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have an influence on our conduct in only two ways: either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connection of causes and effects, so as to provide us with the means of exercising any passion. These are the only kinds of judgment which can accompany our actions, or can be said to produce them in any manner; and it must be allowed that these judgments may often be false and erroneous. A person may be affected by passion by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object which has no tendency to produce either of these sensations, or which produces the opposite of what is imagined. A person may also