A Treatise of Human Nature - Volume 3

take false measures for attaining his end, and may retard, by his foolish conduct, instead of forwarding the execution of any project. These false judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions which are connected with them, and may be said to render them unreasonable, in a figurative and improper way of speaking. But though this is acknowledged, it is easy to observe that these errors are so far from being the source of all immorality that they are commonly very innocent, and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so unfortunate as to fall into them. They do not extend beyond a mistake of fact, which moralists have not generally supposed to be criminal, as being perfectly involuntary. I am more to be pitied than blamed if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or pleasure, or if I do not know the proper means of satisfying my desires. No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character. A fruit, for instance, that is really disagreeable, appears to me at a distance, and through a mistake I imagine it to be pleasant and delicious. Here is one error. I choose certain means of reaching this fruit, which are not proper for my end. Here is a second error; nor is there