A Treatise of Human Nature - Volume 3

Moral distinctions not derived from reason.

It is impossible for such a mistake to ever be the original source of immorality, since it presupposes a real right and wrong; that is, a real distinction in morals, independent of these judgments. A mistake of right, therefore, may become a species of immorality; but it is only a secondary one, and is founded on something else, antecedent to it.

As to those judgments which are the effects of our actions, and which, when false, give occasion to pronounce the actions contrary to truth and reason; we may observe that our actions never cause any judgment, either true or false, in ourselves, and that it is only on others that they have such an influence. It is certain that an action, on many occasions, may give rise to false conclusions in others; and that a person, who through a window sees any lewd behavior of mine with my neighbor's wife, may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own. In this respect my action resembles somewhat a lie or falsehood; only with this difference, which is material, that I perform not the action with any intention of giving rise to a false judgment in another, but merely to satisfy my lust and passion. It causes, however, a mistake and false judgment by accident; and the falsehood of its effects may be ascribed,