A Treatise of Human Nature - Volume 3

can be made by reason; since that distinction has an influence upon our actions, of which reason alone is incapable. Reason and judgment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of an action, by prompting or by directing a reason. The OCR text reads "reason," though the context of Hume's argument and the catchword "passion" suggest the intended word was "passion."

It is well known that those who are squint-sighted very easily cause mistakes in others, and that we imagine they salute or are talking to one person while they address themselves to another. Are they therefore, on that account, immoral?

Besides, we may easily observe that in all those arguments there is an evident circular reasoning. A person who takes possession of another's goods and uses them as his own in a manner declares them to be his own; and this falsehood is the source of the immorality of injustice. But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible without a prior morality?

A man who is ungrateful to his benefactor in a manner affirms that he never received any favors from him. But in what manner? Is it because it is his duty to be grateful? But this supposes that there is some prior rule of duty and morals. Is it because human nature is generally grateful and makes us conclude that a man who does any harm never received any favor from the person he harmed? But human nature is not so generally grateful as to justify such a conclusion. Or if it were, is an exception to a general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason than because it is an exception?

But what may suffice entirely to destroy this whimsical system is that it leaves us under the same difficulty to give a reason why truth is virtuous and falsehood vicious as to account for the merit or wickedness of any other action. I shall allow, if you please, that all immorality is derived from this supposed falsehood in action, provided you can give me any plausible reason why such a falsehood is immoral. If you consider the matter correctly, you will find yourself in the same difficulty as at the beginning.

This last argument is very conclusive; because, if there is not an evident merit or wickedness attached to this species of truth or falsehood, it can never have any influence upon our actions. For who ever thought of refraining from any action because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it? Or who ever performed any so that he might give rise to true conclusions?