On the Mysteries of the Egyptians - Pimander - Asclepius

...ly. The text begins with the suffix "-ly" (original: "ter"), concluding a word from the previous page, likely "consequently" or "similarly." Accidents In Aristotelian philosophy, "accidents" are qualities that can change (like color or size) without changing the core nature of a thing. Iamblichus argues that divine beings have no such changeable qualities. and forms that exist within a subject A "subject" here refers to physical matter that "holds" a form. belong to composite things; they do not apply to immaterial forms. Whatever exists in separate forms Beings that exist independently of physical bodies, such as gods or pure intellects. is pure being and essence in a primary and equal measure. Neither "accidents" nor "consequences" are found there.

Movements and actions differ because of the differences in the beings' natures, not the other way around. If we were to say that all "separate beings" belong to a single genus original: "genus." A broad category used in logic to classify things., we would confuse theology For Iamblichus, "theology" is the study of the divine hierarchy and the nature of the gods.. Separate substances do not meet in some single genus where they might be distinguished by specific differences; instead, they are distinguished by their own selves and by their order of rank, insofar as they are related to the First The "First" refers to the Neoplatonic "One"—the ultimate, undifferentiated source of all existence. through various degrees of perfection. However, those beings that relate to the first and the last in a more similar way share more in common with one another.

The Good is twofold: that which is above essence, and that which exists according to essence. Essence original: "essentia." This refers to the core "being" or "reality" of a thing. is the property of all the Gods. But the Good itself is above essence; it is called the cause of good—the very principle of "essential good." Therefore, the ranks of the Gods are distinguished from one another according to their degrees of essence. In the lowest rational souls This refers to the human soul, which sits at the bottom of the divine hierarchy but still possesses reason., the "essential good" is not present as it is in the gods; rather, there is a participation in the good according to intellectual beauty, though this is present in them immovably.