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We not infrequently observe that action is inspired by example. These things having been fulfilled, therefore, which the grave judgment of a commentator prescribed, I proceed to illustrate with commentaries this most learned work by Ocellus—whom I might call the most brilliant radiance of the Italian philosophy—
Lucr. l. 5.
He left behind the rewards produced in his own breast and sought out
in which, having established a firm purpose to seek out the mind of the author, and keeping this one thing always before my eyes, I shall pursue the rest with minimal adornment. The philosophical gravity is softened slightly by a variety of subjects, so that the reader, thus stimulated, may more sharply fix the edge of his mind and more strongly grasp the most noble tenets of Ocellus. And because I have always observed that not light, but darkness, is poured over this discipline in its teaching by the barbarous terms which most of the moderns have attributed to philosophical science as if they were its own, I have believed these were not at all necessary for constructing philosophical works. Rather, such unheard-of words are only to be used when Cicero advised: when we are dealing with
Acad. q. li. 1.
unusual matters and Latin words perhaps fail. Therefore, whenever easy speech, apt for the teaching of disciplines, permitted, I have judged that they should be avoided, lest the commentary fashioned for the sake of explaining Ocellus be said to require a new explainer itself. However, let no one expect from me an inept λεξιθηρίαν (a fowling for ornate words) in writing the precepts of the sciences; for Xenophon warned that such a thing becomes a sophist rather than a philosopher, for whom it is proper to inquire into things, not words. Indeed, the father of Roman eloquence hinted that philosophical gravity does not require pleasing ornaments of speech when he says,
De fini- bon. & mal. li. 1.
if you bring eloquence from a philosopher, I should not reject it; if he does not have it, I should not greatly demand it. Nor should anyone condemn me because I have made frequent use of the testimonies of Aristotle and other learned men, as if it would have been enough to recount their learned advice while suppressing their names: