This library is built in the open.
If you spot an error, have a suggestion, or just want to say hello — we’d love to hear from you.

...because they cannot know them in the same way they know bodies. When these people wish to rise to a knowledge of minds, out of a bad habit they immediately imagine some subtle bodily thing This likely refers to the historical "ether" or a gaseous "spiritus" that occupied space, which the author argues is a category error. which they take for the nature of the mind or spirit (for we use these words interchangeably). But when they see countless absurdities follow from that supposition, and they cannot fully find rest in those images—through which alone they thought they could attain true knowledge—they preferred to profess that nothing can be known of those things, rather than, as others absurdly do, to pass off those imaginings as knowledge of minds. This is a mark of noble honesty original: "candoris ingenui"; for it is true that no knowledge of minds is possible in the way they imagine, and none at all if that were the only way. However, there remains another way, and a true one, to know them, which will be discussed at greater length hereafter.
V. Finally, there are those who, because they see they cannot comprehend with the intellect all that is in minds, or can be in them—for instance, all the perfections in God, and all the faculties and variations in a created mind—denied for that reason that any knowledge of them exists. In this sense, it must be admitted that knowledge is not possible—not only of minds, but of any tiny body corpuscula: literally "little bodies," referring to the smallest particles of matter—if by "knowledge" one means something so adequate In 17th-century philosophy, "adequate" knowledge meant a complete, exhaustive understanding of a thing's essence and all its properties. that we are conscious of everything that is and can be in a thing. For perhaps not even an angel could determine all the particles of the smallest speck of dust, its motions, their degrees and paths (including possible ones), and similar things belonging to it. God indeed has adequate knowledge of it, since He perfectly knows every single thing within it and every way in which it can be affected. But since there is no reason to think that whatever knowledge a created mind can have of any thing should be considered as perfect as that which God has; and since God’s knowledge is adequate, there is no reason why any knowledge a created mind has should be presumed to be adequate. (But on this matter, see Book III, where God's knowledge is discussed).
Just as it does not follow—even by their own admission—that no knowledge of bodies exists simply because they are conceived inadequately, so this reasoning does not prevent us from asserting that knowledge of spiritual things is possible. It may be a modest original: "mediocrem"; meaning middling or moderate rather than "poor quality" knowledge, not extending from first principles to the furthest recesses, but it is nonetheless truly knowledge, and not mere ignorance. It is a sign of pride to be unwilling to remain within modest limits, and to disdainfully reject everything unless it is granted to you to possess the highest degree.
VI. To these might be added those who claim that spiritual things can only be known in a negative way The author refers to the via negativa, where one defines God or the soul only by what they are not (e.g., "infinite" meaning "not finite").: but we shall deal with them more conveniently elsewhere.