A collection of several philosophical writings

...entirely in the whole, and entirely in every part original Latin: "in toto, and totum in qualibet parte", but that this Assertion (as I once had occasion to write to a clever friend of mine) is a mere sounding contradiction. I proved it to him this way: namely, that the Whole original: "Totum" includes everything that belongs to a thing, both in a positive sense and (consequently) in a negative one. That is to say, if all of A is in B, there is nothing left to be in C, which is distant from B. For it is as if one were to say that there is nothing of A except what is contained within B, and yet at the same moment, not only something of A, but all of A, should also be in C. This is impossible for any singular or individual Essence Essence: the fundamental nature or core identity of a thing; and Universals Universals: general concepts or categories (like "humanity") rather than specific individuals (like "Socrates") are not Things, but Notions.

To this we may further add that this supposition makes the thing of which it is affirmed as small as the smallest conceivable thing. For if the Total is in every point, it is plain that the size original: "amplitude" of this Total is no larger than the point it occupies. This is intolerable when applied to the Deity, and ridiculous in everything else.

Therefore, since it is so mathematically demonstrable that there is something properly called Spirit, and that no Being at all can be totally present in distant points or parts of Matter at once, it unavoidably follows that a Spirit is in some way extended The author argues that spirits must occupy space (extension) rather than being points without size or existing in multiple places at once without spanning the distance between them.

But you will further urge: "If Spirit is extended as well as Body, how shall we imagine Perception to be more compatible with a Spirit than with a Body?" To this I briefly answer that I have already demonstrated that Perception is incompatible with Body, and I challenge anyone to prove the same concerning a Spirit. Furthermore, I ask those who imagine a Spirit to be totally present in every part of Matter whether they can any better understand the immediate reason for the power of perception that way. I also ask those who say it is neither like a mathematical point, nor totally present, nor extended, whether they imagine it is any more capable of that vital Sympathy and Coactivity Coactivity: the ability of different parts of a soul to act together as one that transmits objects in their exact circumstances to the common Percipient Percipient: the entity that perceives or senses. I dare say, if they speak honestly about what they find, they will certainly answer that they gain no advantage in understanding the reason for either simple Perception or the aforementioned vital Sympathy through such theories.

And therefore, in the third place, I will be so bold as to inform them that the truth of my 9th Axiom—which declares that some powers and properties belong immediately to a Subject—had already fully accomplished my purpose. Since there are other properties in the Body that prevent it from being able to perceive, it was necessarily left to some Incorporeal Incorporeal: not composed of matter; having no physical body Substance to be the immediate Subject of the power of Perception. For it must be the immediate power of some Subject or other, as far as our understanding can reach; nor can we find any other adequate cause besides the Subject itself that explains exactly why anything is able to perceive. It is true that we are conscious within ourselves that any Being that perceives must be very Unitive Unitive: having the quality of being a single, indivisible unit. Reason also proves to us that being "One" in a deeper way than Matter is "One" (which is "one" only because its parts are placed next to each other) is a necessary requirement for whatever is capable of the function of Common-Percipiency. Therefore, this unity comes first in nature. But that which is as much "One" as anything can be without a contradiction—that is to say, is so much "One" that it immediately possesses, by its own nature, vital Sympathy and the coactivity of parts, so to speak,

speak,