Dialogues of Love

This explanation of yours satisfies me in part but not entirely, especially since your example mirrors the very doubt about which we are debating.

PHI. I shall speak to you in more universal terms. You know that love is directed toward things that are good, or at least esteemed to be good,
three types of good

because whatever good thing you wish for is lovable; and just as there are three types of good—the profitable, the pleasurable, and the virtuous Original: "honesto." In Renaissance philosophy, this refers to the bonum honestum: that which is morally good or worthy of honor for its own sake, as opposed to what is merely useful or physically pleasing.—
three types of Love

so there are also three types of love: one is pleasurable, the other profitable, and the other virtuous. These last two, whenever they are held, ought to be loved at some time, either truly before they are acquired, or truly afterward. But the pleasurable is no longer loved afterward; for all things that delight our material senses by their nature, once they are possessed, are more often loathed than loved. You must therefore, for this reason, concede that such things are loved before they are possessed, and likewise when they are desired; but because desire fails once they are entirely possessed, the love for them also fails most of the time. And for this reason, you will concede that love and desire can exist together.

SO. Your reasons (in my judgment) have the force to prove your first assertion; yet mine, which are contrary to them, are not for that reason weak, nor stripped of truth. How is it possible, then, for one truth to be contrary to the same truth? Resolve this ambiguity for me, which leaves me quite confused.

PHI. I come, O Sophia, to ask you for a remedy for my pains, and you ask me for a solution to your doubts; perhaps you do this to divert me from this pursuit Original: "pratica." This suggests both their philosophical discussion and Philo’s romantic pursuit of Sophia., which does not please you...