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...rather because they are founded in the being Italian: essere. Philo uses this term to denote existence or the essential nature of a thing. of the thing, and not in its non-being; and for a thing to be desirable, three titles must precede it in order. The first is being; the second, truth; and third, that it be good. And with these attributes, it comes to be loved and desired, which could not happen if it were not first estimated as good—for in no other way would it be loved or desired. And before it is judged good, it must be known as true; and as it is actually found in existence before it is known, it must have real being, because the thing first exists in its being, then it is imprinted upon the intellect, then it is judged to be good, and ultimately it is loved and desired. For this reason, the Philosopher A standard reference to Aristotle, the cornerstone of medieval and Renaissance philosophy. says that being, truth, and goodness are convertible into one Philosophical original: ens, verum, et bonum convertuntur. This means that everything that truly exists is also "true" in its nature and "good" in its purpose.—except that being is in itself; truth is when it is impressed upon the intellect; and goodness is when it moves from the intellect and the will toward the acquisition of things through love and desire. Thus, desire presupposes being no less than love does.
SO. I still see that we desire many things whose being is not only lacking in the one who desires them, but even in the things themselves—such as health and children when we do not have them—in which cases certainly love does not apply, but only desire.
PHI. That which is desired—even if it is lacking to the one desiring it and has no proper being in itself—is not, for all that, entirely deprived of being (as you say). Rather, it must in some way have being; otherwise, it could not be known as good or desired. Even if it does not have its own proper being—and thus I say of health in a sick person, who desires...