Plato’s Timaeus. Folio VI.

But if—which is a crime even to think or conceive in the mind—he had looked toward a created model: since that is contrary to reason, it is clear that the God who is the maker followed the pattern of a venerable example in establishing the world. Indeed, this world is the most beautiful of all things generated; he is the greatest of authors, and by the reason and wisdom of his work, he is adapted to those things which always exist in the same way: the world is, I believe, an image of another. And since it is not easy to explain the reason for its origin, we must distinguish between the nature of the image and the model. The causes which show why each thing exists are kindred to those very things. Therefore, for a thing of a constant kind, a stable nature, and clear to the intellect and wisdom, the cause and reason found are constant, clear, and invincible. But truly, the reason for that which was made in the likeness of a constant and perpetual thing—being an imaginary version of an image and a mere likeness of reason—borrows only a superficial similarity. By as much as essence is better than generation original: "essentia generatione"; referring to the philosophical distinction between eternal Being and the changing world of Becoming, so much is truth more excellent than the uncertainty of fame and opinion. Therefore, I now predict, O Socrates: if, while disputing the nature of the entire universe, I am unable to offer reasons that are entirely unshakable and invincible, do not be surprised. Rather, look to this: if I offer reasons no less consistent than anyone else. For remember that both I who speak and you who judge are but men; and in such sublime matters, even a mediocre explanation is a burden of great labor.

SOCRATES. We all willingly grant you pardon, O Timaeus; and yet I admire the beginning of your speech. It remains for you to carry out the laws of this sacred contest.

TIMAEUS. We must say, then, why the founder and fabricator of generation thought that this whole world should be established. He was the best; and from the best, envy is far removed. Therefore, consequently, he willed that all things should be made like unto himself, insofar as the nature of each was capable of receiving blessedness. If anyone should posit this will of God as the most certain origin of things, I would agree that he thinks rightly. For God, wishing that all things should turn out good and that no trace of evil should be left behind—insofar as the nature of created things allows—took all that was visible and corporeal, which was fluctuating in turbulent motion and never resting, and reduced it from disordered tossing into order; for he knew that the form of ordered things is superior to the confused and disordered. Nor was it lawful for the highest goodness to do anything except what is beautiful; and it was certain to such great divinity that nothing among those things which are perceived by the senses is better than that which possesses intelligence. Furthermore, intelligence cannot exist except in a soul. By this reasoning, therefore, having placed the intellect in the soul, and the soul in the body, he composed the entire circuit of the living world with venerable splendor. From this it appears that the sensible world is a living animal original: "animal intelligens"; here meaning a "living being" endowed with soul/intellect, not a beast through the decree of divine providence.

This being established, the following things must be explained: In the likeness of which living being did its creator constitute it? Certainly not in the likeness of any specific individual. For perfection is found in the genus, not in the species; and therefore a world similar to an imperfect thing would be far from perfect. Rather, it is in the likeness of that in which all genera and, as it were, the "sources" of intelligible animals are contained. For one world encompasses the genera of animals, just as this world encompasses us and the other things subject to sight and the other senses. Therefore, the Creator God, wishing to produce a likeness to the most excellent and principal intelligible substance, which is perfect in every way, established one visible living animal; containing within its own enclosure and limit all things which enjoy life according to their nature.

¶ Now we must also consider whether we have rightly said there is one world, or whether it would be more appropriate to say there are many, or even innumerable ones. Clearly one: since it was formed according to one model. For that which contains all intelligible things [cannot be joined] with another...

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