With Chalcidius as Interpreter

...is born, likewise another in which it is born, and furthermore a third from which the thing being born draws its likeness and borrows its form. It is fitting, therefore, to make a comparison and assign a likeness: to that which receives, the role of the mother; to that from which it derives, the father; and to that nature which exists between these two, the offspring. At the same time, it must be understood in this way: it is impossible for a single face to exist that contains all the forms and countenances of all things, showing various aspects of the body from every side, unless there is first an unformed substrate—a certain bodily womb—just as in paintings, a colorless base layer original: "infectio decolor" is spread underneath to bring out the lights of the colors.

FF

¶ For indeed, if the receptacle were similar to any of those things which it receives into itself, then when something dissimilar to those things it resembles arrived, its "face" would, I believe, clash with the face of the entering body, and it would express no true likeness. From this it follows that the bosom of the receptacle has no naturally expressed figure of its own; therefore, it is understood to be unformed, lacking every shape entirely. Just as those who prepare fragrant ointments take care above all that the base liquids which are to be seasoned have no scent of their own, so that they may better receive the liquid juices of the perfumes. And those who wish to impress certain forms into soft materials that yield to pressure prepare them to be perfectly smooth, allowing no shape at all to appear in the prepared smoothness. In this same way, for that which is to be rightly impressed with all the forms and figures of all things—those which are eternal and remain through the ages—no proper appearance of its own should be attributed by false opinion. Therefore, we must call the mother and receptacle of this created, generated, and visible living thing The "animal" or "living world" described by Plato. and of bodily substance neither earth, nor water, nor indeed fire, nor air, nor anything created from them, nor even the elements from which these themselves subsist. Rather, we should call it a certain invisible species and an unformed capacity, situated by a marvelous and incomprehensible reason between non-substance and some substance—neither plainly intelligible nor plainly sensible—but which seems able to be understood from those things that are changed within it. Indeed, the ignited part of it is fire; the moistened part of it is water—if indeed any part can be named in a thing so devoid of qualities. It also becomes earth and air by that same reasoning, if by chance it receives their likenesses into itself. Concerning each of these, a treatise of this kind must be established:

GG

¶ Is there some fire positioned apart and uncommunicable? Likewise, are there other species Forms or Ideas which we, conceiving them in the mind, say are separated from the gathering of bodily species to be the archetypal models of sensible things? Or are these things which are seen, and which we perceive through the intensity of the body, the only things that exist? Is there nothing else besides these anywhere, and is it presumed in vain that there are intelligible species of which sensible things are images—and that these species are nothing other than words? This matter should neither be left unexamined, nor should a long train of words be added that is irrelevant to the subject. But truly, if someone can settle the dispute of this great matter with a summary, it is the duty of a worker to adopt that path. I myself, therefore, will say what I feel regarding this matter:

HH

¶ If intellect and true opinion are two different things, it is necessary that these [Forms] be attained through the intellect itself rather than through the senses. But if, as it seems to some, true opinion does not differ from intellect, then all things which we perceive as bodily must be held as certain. But I believe it must be said †to be said. that they are two, because they are separated by a great difference. For indeed, instruction teaching/doctrine instills the one in us, while the adoption of persuasion instills the other. The one is always accompanied by true reason, while the other is without any reason. Furthermore, the one cannot be changed by any persuasion, while the other is wavering, uncertain, and always †divertible, divertible. What more? Every man partakes in right opinion, but intellect is the property of God and of a very few chosen men. Since this is so...