ON THE DIVISION OF NATURE.

ON THE DIVISION OF NATURE.

BOOK ONE.

Teacher. Often as I think, and as diligently as my strength allows, I inquire into the fact that the first and highest division of all things—which can either be perceived by the mind or surpass its reach—is into those things that are and those things that are not. A general term for all these occurs to me, which in Greek is called physis original: "φύσις" and in Latin is called Natura (Nature). Does it seem otherwise to you? Disciple. On the contrary, I agree; for as I enter the path of reasoning, I find these things to be so. T. Since we are then in agreement about this term being general, I would like you to state the method of its division into species by their differences; or if you prefer, I will first attempt to divide it, and it will be your part to judge the divisions. D. Proceed, I beg you; for I am impatient, wishing to hear the true reasoning about these things from you.

1. T. It seems to me that the division of Nature through four differences receives four species: The first is that which creates and is not created; the second is that which is created and creates; the third is that which is created and does not create; the fourth is that which neither creates nor is created. Of these four, two are opposed to each other in pairs; for the third is opposed to the first, and the fourth to the second. But the fourth is placed among the impossibilities; its difference is the inability to be. Does such a division seem correct to you or not? D. Correct indeed; but I would like you to repeat it, so that the opposition of the aforementioned forms may shine forth more clearly. T. You see, unless I am mistaken, the opposition of the third species to the first; for the first creates and is not created, to which is opposed, by contrast, that which is created and does not create. The second is opposed to the fourth, since the second both creates and is created, which the fourth universally contradicts, as it neither creates nor is created. D. I see clearly. But the fourth species you added moves me much: for about the others I would not dare to hesitate, since the first, as I judge, is understood as the Cause of all things that are and are not. The second is in the primordial causes. The third is in those things known in generation, times, and places, and therefore it is necessary to dispute each one more subtly, as I see. T. You judge rightly; but I leave it to your judgment in what order the path of reasoning should be held—that is, which species should be discussed first. D. It seems right to me to speak of the first before the others, whatever the light of minds shall have granted.

2. T. Let it be so; but first I think we must speak briefly of the highest and principal division of all, as we said, into those things that are and those things that are not. D. Rightly and providently; for I do not see that the reasoning ought to begin from any other starting point: not only because it is the first difference of all, but because it seems to be, and is, more obscure than the others. T. Therefore, this primordial distributive difference of all things requires certain modes of interpretation.

3. The first of these modes seems to be that by which reason persuades us that all things which succumb to bodily sense or the perception of intelligence can reasonably be said to be; but those things which, through the excellence of their nature, flee not only beyond original: "ὑπὲρ" (hyper) all sense, but even beyond intellect and reason, rightly seem not to be. These are correctly understood only in God alone, in matter, and in the reasons and essences of all things which have been founded by Him. And not without merit; for He Himself is the essence of all things, who alone truly is, as Dionysius the Areopagite A 5th-6th century Christian philosopher whose works were translated by Eriugena. says. To be, he says, for all things, is the "super-being" of divinity. Gregory the Theologian Gregory of Nazianzus, one of the Cappadocian Fathers. also confirms by many reasons that no substance of either visible or invisible creatures can be comprehended by intellect or reason as to what it is. For just as God Himself in Himself is comprehended by no intellect beyond every creature: so also in the most secret boundaries of the creature made by Him, and consisting in Him, that creature is incomprehensible when considered. However, whatever in every creature,

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