Psychological Automatism

Biran Pierre Maine de Biran (1766–1824), a French philosopher who emphasized the role of the "will" in consciousness. ¹. We also regret not having cited more often the work of Dr. Gerdy, who expresses on several occasions ideas quite analogous to those of Maine de Biran. To study these facts, he says, "one must become accustomed to understanding that there can be sensation without perception of the sensation" ². Indeed, to interpret cataleptic attitudes Catalepsy: a physical state of trance or seizure with loss of sensation and consciousness, where the body remains in a fixed posture., we have been led, like these authors, to admit the existence of elementary phenomena as simple as possible. These phenomena still had to have the character of psychological facts, but they were devoid of that reflective consciousness which consists primarily in the assimilation of phenomena into the personality.

Undoubtedly such phenomena are not absolutely simple, and one can decompose consciousness infinitely; undoubtedly one can, in a more or less theoretical way, find in these facts the essential elements that are attributed to consciousness—"the will-to-live, appetition appetition: a natural desire or instinctive craving., etc." ³—but, on the one hand, we did not have to depart from pure observation to seek to determine the essential nature of the facts of consciousness; on the other hand, it was enough for us to show the relatively simple character of such phenomena and the difference that separated them from the usually known facts of consciousness. Moreover, we are quite disposed to admit, with Mr. William James ⁴, that such facts must be very rudimentary to remain thus impersonal; as soon as they become a little complicated, they "tend to take on the form of personality," which happens in somnambulisms somnambulism: sleepwalking or a similar trance-like state. or in subconscious writings, whether they be suggested or natural. As we remarked, words heard during catalepsy as simple sounds and which are not understood, can awaken in the form of memories in a later, more intelligent state. They will then be understood by a person and will have their suggestive power. The tendency toward synthesis and personality remains the general character of psychological phenomena.

Throughout the course of this work, we have insisted on the close relationship that seems to exist between psychological phenomena and physiological phenomena, in particular between thoughts and movements. We have tried to show that sensations and images were accompanied by movements of the limbs and that, on the other hand, the disappearances of the sensation or the image provoked a parallel suppression in movements, so much so that certain paralyses could be considered as amnesias (p. 350, 362): "There are not," we said, "two faculties, one that of thought, the other that of activity; there is at each moment only one and the same phenomenon always manifesting itself in two different ways." This dependence of the two phenomena is certainly true in its generality; we have since verified it many times. Thus, we express regret for not having at our disposal the description

¹ Deleuze. Memoir on the faculty of foresight, with notes by Malle, p. 145.
² Gerdy. Sensations and intelligence, 1846, 23 to 29.
³ Fouillée. Psychology of idea-forces, 1893, II, 372.
⁴ William James. Principles of psychology, 1890, I, 229.