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To confirm the nature of contingency original: "utrūlibet," meaning "either-way" or things that can happen or not happen, here is the first argument: since all knowledge of the necessary and the impossible is natural, it is distinguished by three times: present, past, and future. For example, smoke [indicates] fire, and it has always been hot, is hot, and will be hot; it has never been cold, nor will it ever be. Accidental things, however, are not like this: for we know a man has written or is writing, but we do not know if he will write; for it is possible he will write, and possible he will not. Therefore, that is neither impossible nor necessary, for it can both happen and not happen. It is, therefore, contingent. ¶ The second argument is: the necessary and the impossible exist equally in every genus and species. For indeed, all men are equally mortal, and all fire is equally not cold; but the contingent is not so, such as a man walking or a man not walking. Likewise, neither the necessary nor the impossible changes; but the contingent is changeable, as from motion to rest and vice versa. ¶ The third argument is: since in those things which are proposed, everyone first thinks and deliberates whether to do or avoid it. Then [they consider] when, how, where, and that sort of thing. All things are first prescribed by thought and imagination; then finally, the action follows the deliberation of the author. But the necessary and the impossible require neither counsel nor deliberation. For no amount of effort will add anything; nature itself grants that fire certainly burns and is never cold; it is consistent that the contingent exists. ¶ The fourth reasoning is that for all necessary and impossible things, there is only one and a simple path. For one, it is only to be; for the other, it is never to be. But in many things, we see a twin power, such as to be or not to be, and to be thus or not thus; as the air is now warm, now cold; now more, now less; it is therefore contingent. Because of this, the Philosopher Aristotle defines it. Every contingent thing follows the necessary or the impossible in this way: Since everything that is in [the power of] will and deliberation, such as going or not going, is possible before it happens. But once done, it is necessary; and the other alternative is likewise impossible. Since, therefore, the contingent is established, it will also be established that the stars original: "sidera," referring to celestial bodies/planets provide leadership in three modes of things: the necessary, the impossible, and the contingent. For just as every body of this world consists of the four elements—as is found in all things—so every element is resolved from one into another and must be capable of increase and decrease. Even the bodies of men are subject to dissolution and receptive to increase and decrease. Since, therefore, the stars preside over the movements of the elements and it is consistent that they lead the alterations of bodies: as when this rational soul the human intellect and the four natures consist together, and the substance of the stars—as the Philosopher understood—is one [composed] of rational soul and natural motion, they have a law of their own kind. They fit souls confirmed by harmony to bodies for themselves in the design of the creator of both. Thus, the power of the rational soul is will and deliberation; but the power of the body is inclined toward either side. Since, therefore, the stars moderate the harmony of the soul and the body, it is consistent that they lead the necessary and the impossible as well as the contingent. Such as the ultimate fate of man, or that he is unfit for flight, or that he is now healthy, now sick; and this same thing is what the office of astrology the study of celestial influence chiefly provides. For the astrologer practitioner of celestial science does not undertake to foresee whether a man will die; for he holds it certain that this is inevitable; but rather whether [he dies] tomorrow or the day before. Since, therefore, the leadership of the stars precedes the events of things, they are first in the stars as a potentiality original: "potentia". After the event, they approach the boundaries of the necessary or the impossible; just as before fire burns, it is indeed a potentiality; then it becomes a necessity. Therefore, the contingent is divided into two parts: in the deliberation of the rational soul and in the composition of nature through the [passage of time]...