Phantasms of the Living, Vol. I

§ 7. We must consider how these sources of error affect the evidence for spontaneous telepathy. Such a case presents a coincidence with four main points: (1) A specific state of the agent, such as the crisis of death; (2) a specific experience of the percipient, such as seeing the agent; (3) the date of the first event; and (4) the date of the second . . . . . . . . 131–132

§ 8. The risk of mistake regarding the agent's state is rarely significant; their death, for example, can usually be proven beyond dispute . . . . . . . 132

For the percipient's experience, we generally rely solely on their word, which is often sufficient for our purposes. The evidential requirement is merely that they state they had a peculiar impression or sensation—a point that remains valid regardless of whether they incorrectly interpreted it as an objective reality when it was actually a hallucination . . . . 133–134

The risk of misrepresentation is lowest if their description, or a course of action based on it, preceded their knowledge of what happened to the agent . . . . 134–136

§ 9. Where the description follows the knowledge of the agent's circumstances, there is a possibility that this knowledge made the experience seem more striking than it actually was. Still, we have not found definite instances of this type of inaccuracy. Nor would the fact that the experience did not suggest the agent at the time—which witnesses often state—destroy the presumption of telepathy, though it would weaken it . . . . . . . . 136–138

§ 10. Regarding the time interval between the two events, we have adopted an arbitrary limit of 12 hours. The coincidence is usually much closer; however, no case will be presented as telepathic if the percipient’s experience preceded a grave event occurring to an agent who was in a normal state at the time of the percipient's experience . . 138–140

§ 11. The risk of misstatement is greatest regarding dates. The instinct for simplification and dramatic completeness tends to make coincidences appear more exact than the facts warrant . . . . . . . . 140–142