THE DISTINCTION OF PHILOSOPHY.

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Aristotle himself also admits that what most deserves to be called being original: "ens", because the part is smaller than the whole The "universal" or "whole" here refers to a general category like a genus or species., must also be established as lesser and inferior in the definition of substance. especially the one corrected? However, if he were speaking of the universal in the way the universal is often accustomed to be understood, then what he says would not be foreign to reason. For it is possible, and indeed not rare, for the universal to lose the character of a universal when we do not mean every man, but rather some specific man; nor every animal, but a certain one. Now, however, he does not seem to be speaking of that universal which has lost its universal character, but of the universal understood simply, and of the nature of genera and species understood simply. He was perhaps led to this opinion by such an argument: that sometimes a human is more excellent than a certain animal, and Socrates Socrates is used here as the classic example of an "individual" substance. is more excellent than a certain man. But truly, concerning the universal that retains its universal character, no such thing can be said. For if there is no difference between these two: "every man" and "all men," then "all men" furthermore differ from individuals—and from all of them together—by no other thing than this: that the latter are usually taken together, while the former are taken separately. What reason then will there be for individual men to be more fundamental substances than "every man," and for them to be more and more truly [substances] than "every man," unless indeed all things that are taken separately are more fundamental than those which are taken together and jointly? And this indeed, according to Aristotle’s own opinion, would not be improbable, because he willingly quarrels with that which is one, but greatly rejoices in the division and multiplication of being. But in truth, this cannot please us, while we consider that even by God, the universal nature of humans was not created for the sake of any one man, but rather individual men were created and established for the sake of the universal nature of humans; and that the nature of humans itself exists for the sake of the universal nature endowed with reason.