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they are, then they are indeed idealistic, yet for that
reason they are not (as many consider
synonymous) teleological derivations; explanations based on a final purpose or "end goal" rather than physical causes (teleologische Ableitungen), which
can be no more satisfying in Idealism; the philosophy that reality is fundamentally shaped by the mind (Idealismus) than in any
other system. For even if I prove,
for example, that for the sake of freedom; the capacity of the will to act independently (Freyheit) or
for practical purposes it is necessary that
matter; the physical substance of the world (Materie) exists with these or those determinations: specific properties or characteristics,
or that the intelligence; the conscious, thinking subject or the mind (Intelligenz) views its
actions upon the external world as being
mediated through an organism; a living, self-regulating system (Organismus),
this proof still leaves the
question unanswered: how and through
which mechanism; the structural "machinery" of how the mind works (Mechanismus) does the intelligence
perceive exactly that which
is necessary for that purpose.
Rather, all proofs that the
Idealist offers for the existence of
specific external things must be derived from
the original mechanism of intuition; the immediate mental perception or "looking upon" an object (Anschauen)
itself—that is, they must be conducted through
an actual construction; the mental act of producing or "building" an object of knowledge within the mind (Construction) of the objects.
The merely teleological turn of the