Process and Reality (1929) - Page 13

...in the Cartesian sense of that term;² it is a Cartesian "substance" original: "substance"; Cartesian substance refers to René Descartes' definition of a thing that requires nothing but itself to exist, and not an Aristotelian "primary substance" original: "primary substance"; Aristotle’s term for an individual thing—like a specific person or animal—that carries various traits. But Descartes kept the Aristotelian habit of treating "quality" (a thing's characteristics) as more important than "relatedness" (how things connect). In these lectures, "relatedness" is more important than "quality."

All relationships are grounded in the way actual things relate to one another. This relatedness is entirely concerned with how the living "take in" or use the dead. This is the concept of "objective immortality" objective immortality: the way an event, after it has finished happening, remains a real and necessary influence on all future events. Through this process, once a thing loses its own active, living experience, it becomes a real part of other new, living experiences as they come into being. This is the theory that the "creative advance" of the world consists of things becoming, perishing, and then persisting as influences. Together, these elements constitute "stubborn fact" stubborn fact: the fixed, unchangeable reality of the past that every new event must account for.

The history of philosophy reveals two major worldviews original: "cosmologies" that have dominated European thought at different times: Plato's Timaeus³ and the 17th-century worldview created by thinkers like Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Locke. In attempting a project of the same kind, it is wise to follow the clue that the true solution might be a fusion of these two previous systems, modified to be consistent and to reflect the progress of modern knowledge.

The worldview explained in these lectures was built by relying on the positive value of the philosophical tradition. One test of a successful philosophy is its ability to explain the vast variety of human experiences using a single, consistent scheme of ideas. My effort to meet this requirement is shown by comparing Chapters 3, 7, and 10 of Part II—titled "The Order of Nature," "The Subjectivist Principle," and "Process"—with Chapter...

² I learned about this element of Descartes' thought from Professor Étienne Gilson of the Sorbonne. I believe he is the first to insist on its importance. He is, of course, not responsible for how I have used the idea in these lectures.

³ I regret that Professor A. E. Taylor's Commentary on Plato's Timaeus was published only after this work was sent to the printer. Therefore, with the exception of one small reference, I could not make use of it. I am very much indebted to Professor Taylor's other writings.