The Enneads

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On What is the Living Being, and What is Man

7.

Pleasures and pains, fears and daring, desires and aversions, and the sensation of pain—to whom might these belong? For they belong either to the soul, or to the soul using a body as an instrument, or to a third thing composed of both. And this "composite" might be understood in two ways: either as the mixture itself, or as something entirely different that arises from the mixture. The same question applies to the "affections" original: "παθήματα" — these are the passive experiences or emotions that happen to a person. arising from these states: are they the experiences and the sensations themselves? Therefore, we must also investigate opinions: where do they come from, what is the nature of the experience, and does it belong to the soul itself or to the "common" original: "κοινόν" — the Neoplatonic term for the union of soul and body, the biological organism. entity? We must also investigate thoughts—how they occur and to whom they belong. Indeed, we must consider the act of reasoning itself: who is it that carries out the inquiry or the questioning? Is it the soul that knows, or is it the man? Should we perhaps propose that the soul is impassive Impassive: the state of being "apathes," meaning the higher soul is not affected or changed by physical suffering or worldly emotions., acting as the cause for the body that uses it? Or does the soul itself suffer and experience, or is it some combination of both? But how can there be a combination?

From where would these experiences come? Yet, it must be the soul. If indeed opinion and sensation belong to the soul, then we must say that there is a foundation original: "ὑπόστασιν" — the underlying reality or level of existence. of causes, and causes such as the experiences themselves, or the act of experiencing, or that which depends upon the soul; in this way, sensations and opinions are either a "use" of the body or an "activity" of the soul. If sensations belong to the soul, then the soul is where they reside, and hope would be in the soul as well. But can hope be satisfied within the breast original: "στέρνοις" — Plotinus here questions the physical location of emotions, often placed in the chest by earlier poets, versus their true psychic origin.? That is not the cause. Let the argument be clear, whether it is in the soul itself or as some nature as a whole. For there is also that which is impassive, which we must care for more.

One would say that the soul is either more "beyond passion" or inexpressible; this is a necessity. Pain is something separate from it, but I prefer to focus on that which is present in all things concerning it. For what would the immortal soul fear? It cannot suffer from anything on the outside. If such a thing were afraid, it would be shown to be a passive experience. Or perhaps it is something that has become stable. For none of these things, or the things feared, can touch it. To say that lives are happy original: "Εὐδαίμονα" — eudaimonia, or flourishing, which Plotinus argues belongs to the soul's true life., appearing after transformations and reaching fulfillment, comes from the ceasing of these movements. What sort of speech is this? It is that which is better than the "form," and some things within the soul. For we are able to act in this way. That which is described belongs to the body. We are indeed pained—either because of ourselves, or by necessity. For these things do not belong to humans alone. If we turn toward what is truly ours... but it is, somehow, a race that has come into being. Harmful things come from the "making" original: "ποιήσεως" — the process of soul descending into the physical world of creation. of what exists, so that it is always so.