· Ennead VI ·

G.

...of the wholes. The text begins mid-word, likely "place of the wholes." From the psychic intellect? Or from the Whole? Is it not also the case that the things in the world are ordered, or that they set things in order—so to speak—as in the case of sexual matters? For the desire for these same things is not for sensible objects, but belongs to the soul of those who are not merely "others" original: "ἄλλων" — likely referring to the distinction between the physical body and the true self.. And what they say regarding the "Grace" from the chorus: from that source comes the choice of this cause, as if the underlying subject hypokeimenos|The underlying substance or subject that supports qualities were not the same, or as if it did not subsist anywhere else through another person or thing, it will perceive. In another way, someone is the same as the underlying subject, and communicates through the desiring faculty; but in terms of the whole, he is nowhere the same, unless there is a pre-eminence of the subject. The subject exists, but its impulses are not so disposed toward themselves, but toward the outside. However, it is better to call upon the powers of the living being. Such things are understood in the ritual silence original: "εὐφημίᾳ" — often refers to a holy silence or auspicious speech during religious rites.. But was there a beginning? Are these things reasoned or terrible? Or do they simply "possess"? From this, they run together. For because of the cause of the "released" living being—its reason—their existence was a necessity. For of the things in the work, of the one who possesses it thus: from this, which was the whole of the soul. Concerning that (perhaps referred to), or not even (referred to), so as not to affirm it. But he is not [a product] of power or of the removal of power. Rather, it is in potentiality. But sensation, by means of judging, would be the rational soul, and the soul perceives. For what then? Are not the objects of sensation images, while the things that exist by themselves are the sensibles? This is false. That which must be perceived together is not a communion of sensation; it is not so. It is necessary, if the soul does not perceive together, that the powers of the soul do not either. And one must perceive together the sight of the soul along with sensation. Or, in the sources, one does not perceive the tensions of the body, or that which is more [apparent]. But it would not be so much of the whole, lying as we appear to do for the rational perceiver. By the nature of the living being, it is nothing. Or of the sensitive [soul]. That which is entirely "living" is well said. But we also perceive. Or is it because the living being is analogous to the Intelligible noētos|The realm of pure thought or divine mind, as opposed to the physical world, and the other things united together are thus entirely the same by nature according to a cause? The things of the soul fall short of the sensitive soul, or the sensible world falls short of it. Of the things that come to be in the living being from sensation, perhaps it is the cause, but rather it is something more. For even the things here perceive nothing outside. If we indeed say these things: are they images or truths in their entire essence, or simply the thing itself, among similar things?

But from these Forms ideōn|The eternal Blueprints or archetypes of all things, from which the whole soul is composed, it was only able to live, but it bears the fruit of discursive thought and reason. Then, because long ago, or rather before these things. However you wish, from the purpose of living beings and the things in them—that which belongs to its living, at least—only death [is excluded]. But the things of them, in them, one might truly say. If not, he would exclude seeing the sweetest things entirely. For this [reason] harmonizes that which comes from the Intelligible to the soul; whenever we reason, we perceive. For the soul in its separate state is without sensation, nor indeed does it possess intellect. How? It thinks there too, but not the soul as if it were digging through the intellect. Or does it not also have joint-perception in this? Some, however, say this: for just as with images. For example, it is necessary that even the living thing here comes into being, because if it has something clear of it in the soul, it has these things. For if living beings are twofold: so that those in the soul are like impressions and like images. It would be
G.

where all things are together. But how are they not [together]? And because of these Forms, he who is the Intelligible Living Being original: "νοητὸν ζῶον" — The Platonic concept of the "Animal-itself," the divine archetype containing the patterns of all species. [contains] us in part. But someone will say first that even in those things, they will not be the same; and what if sensation alone is here? That which is not even a chance reflection, or how much it is by sensation or the cosmos. For that which is according to an image. Or because they imagine them not as a passion original: "πάθος" — a passive experience or suffering., but they think them by the intellect, and thus one thinks, ascending as if there were some method, this very difference. It is shown by itself, not in some other way in all the hypostases hypostases|The levels of reality: the One, Intellect, and Soul. According to the lesser, there is a sensation in the Intelligible realm. Then from that one, before them, she is called Soul; she who leads away into the last things, as far as the generative part, which perceives. Or they entirely validate [the sensation] of another and an exclusive thing without the branches of "thatness," she herself always touching the whole, alone in her craftiness. Each of us would then say that the soul is of the first rank, touching upon everything because it was so long ago; for life is not life in this way; and to many of these. From the opinion of art and obscurity, how they make things vanish. For they say that each thing, being struck, has been spread abroad as evil things? Or are we not such? Being stayed by them. For not all [are such], or just like voices, or but also. And the things said before are a "speakable" imagination original: "λεκτὴ φαντασία" — a technical Stoic term for a mental representation that can be expressed in language. which, being removed...