· Ennead I ·

Column 1

But how does it relate to the reasoning faculty? Or is it because those [perceptions] reach all the parts? Not all of the senses, and the reasoning faculty likewise. For one says (primarily) that this "sensible" thing does not belong to the soul, nor to what the soul truly is Plotinus is distinguishing between the true, higher soul and the lower functions associated with the body.. Rather, it is likely that it happens through motion. These [faculties] do not touch that experience original: "πάθους" — often translated as 'passion' or 'passive experience,' referring to something the soul undergoes. within the intelligible realm. For even there, such things are possible, if the living being were not present. Or are those things here and those things there distinct? One is the vital part. The human being—neither the soul nor the body nor the activity—are these things private to the soul? And are they powers of the reasoning faculty? And how does it receive the opinion derived from sense-perception? For it already contemplates, and in contemplating, it is not concerned with sensible objects. But does one wonder about the soul’s being? How is the soul—either alone, or with [the body]? And how is there a communion that flees toward the things dwelling within? For would everything in us be "the whole"? Or not the whole, but only as much as we possess? But what is in us, such as the life-giving things and the things belonging to the Mind, such as "thinking," belongs to the soul itself. But how are we "we"? Is it by receiving? And does the soul undergo these sufferings? And the virtues? Or all of them? And then again, not so. We said, however, that they exist, and especially among the defined things. Or on one hand, our savior original: "σωτῆρα" — This may be a transcription variant for "living being" (ζῷον), though the scribe has written "savior.", they say, suffers alongside. But the soul itself, which is conjoined original: "συμφυὴς" with the body, or the whole which is private. One must say (savior) that which we might call a bond itself. The intelligible world. Therefore, the virtues do not belong to it in this way. For what is said to happen to the soul, the soul being separate, if anything is in it. But if mind belongs to it: how then to all? For the soul itself errs when it is preoccupied (subjected). But are the burdens entirely within the Form? One should not be grieved. Of the mind? Or do the things that come into being not allow both life and the living? But light is reason original: "φῶς δὲ λόος" — a central Neoplatonic metaphor where the intellect illuminates the lower soul.. Either it is the soul itself, or like it, the form is the soul itself. But how is it not everything? Close indeed is the name derived from the (body), belonging to the same living psychic things. For when our soul is itself. Our forms. When it fights with the mind and the whole. What then? We become that which belongs to that [higher realm], for do we alternate by race? Or are we not [ourselves]? Then we shall use [it]; and many things rather come to be, so that the things above, or toward the opposites; or we forget those things which we had, or we possess an activity.

Column 2

For painful things do not belong to the [true] man; the fear in the soul prior to the suffering is not the starting point, but pain belongs to the human [composite]. If this becomes strange, it is a matter of naming; but from where does the perception of these things come? From the suffering itself? Or from the soul entirely? Or from the soul with the body? One might hold that some things are in the body, such as a wound or a sore, and nothing prevents the soul from being in the state of a slave original: "δούλου" — suggesting the soul is enslaved to bodily sensations. by not being [itself]? And entirely, he who has become a living being by nature exists. But the soul is "perceptive," and it perceives this. But I speak of the body undergoing pain, which the man who transcends the mind Likely referring to the philosopher or "the man" of Plato's Republic. speaks of; and because of opinions and suffering, and with it? How indeed? ?????? And so someone will wish to speak. For the soul is in the body and mixed in such a way, the impulse of painful things is seen in the "soul-body" original: "ψυχοσωματικῷ" — the psychosomatic entity where soul and body overlap., not in the soul by itself. Or is it the soul itself? Or is it to say "to be in the soul"? But the human being is to himself a kind of "addition" and an affinity to them, and the living being comes from the soul; hence it is for all others. It is a composite syntheton|The 'together-thing,' the union of immaterial soul and material body that forms the earthly human being. then, and that which undergoes suffering is in the soul, as it were. Or is it from the mind and countable (or a property) and that which belongs to its being? Neither is it pain, but it itself. Not clear. But the remaining passions are like those who have "owls" on their scales original: "γλαύκας ἔχοντες" — a reference to Athenian coins stamped with an owl. Plotinus uses this to describe those weighed down by material or "heavy" concerns.; but how are the sensible things circled, and what is the dissolution of the passions? One must say that philosophy itself is private and does not stumble. According to nature. But are there "intelligible living beings"? How? And the "thought-world" [intelligible world]. And the practical world and entirely the motion of the living being, but also the sensible things in them. For even in the generative part is the power of seeds. How does the innate soul possess so much? Or is every birth such that things are contrary to nature? But this must happen because the essence descends original: "καταβαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν" — the Neoplatonic concept of the soul's descent into the material world.. The soul itself releases entirely, both the winged things and the perceptive things for all, let it be made dimly, using the perceptive part itself. And if not the [inner] man, then these things, and the practical part. But some things are like its own thinking, the soul having been constituted entirely not by itself. It releases oil A metaphor for the soul's light or its animating influence being poured out onto the body., the underlying subject from the liquid. It releases it, even if that which departs is from that which is nothing. And what is its own, and because of this it is separated as a whole, just as a citizen is from the laws in the city. He will give it then to the soul itself because of its being in a body, a sketch of the downward passions; and because...