The Enneads

...to preserve; so that sensation belongs to the prior composition of the living being. Plotinus is arguing that sensation requires a specific relationship between the soul and the physical body, rather than being a property of either one in isolation.
αPleasures and pains, fears and bold confidence, desires and
βaversions, and the sensation of physical pain—to what might these belong? For they would belong either to the soul in its separated state, original: "κεχωρισμένης" — referring to the soul as a pure, immaterial essence independent of the flesh.
or to the soul as it exists in the body, or to the composite entity formed from both. For to say that "we" or "the soul"
are affected by these, or that the composite is, carries a double meaning. And to say that "we" or the soul
γare affected by these, or the composite, is twofold. The repetition here in the Greek text suggests a scribal emphasis or a common variant in the manuscript tradition regarding the definition of the "Self." But if the soul experiences these, does it
suffer them while separated, or while possessing the body? Or is it not the soul itself that suffers, but that which
possesses it, or that which it possesses? And how does pain arise? If the soul itself suffers, is it the body suffering or also
the soul that produces the life-breath and this kind of movement in the living being? The same question
applies to desire. For instance, if there is an affection Affection: From the Greek "pathos," meaning something that happens to a person, an experience, or a passive state of being acted upon. within the body, or concerning the body.
Are we those who perceive and sense, or would we not be the ones
δexperiencing the pleasure or the pain? But how does pain occur? Either it belongs to the body
in this way, or also to the soul, so that it belongs to the soul or to the power within the soul
εitself. Why then are these passions in the soul? Is it out of necessity? Or how?
For instance, the relationship between the possessor and the passion; or does the soul merely look upon it
either in this way, or that way? And is it the soul's power, or because the soul itself is the possessor?
Of these, some belong to the sensations, which belong to the soul as a whole, if one should say that
the soul is naturally joined to it, being within itself—and what would our
reasoning say? For surely we would not cast away its immortality. Plotinus is concerned that if the soul can "suffer" or be changed by physical pain, it might not be truly eternal and changeless. Or how could it be
immortal and incorruptible if it were subject to suffering? But how indeed could
this other thing not come to be, before the indivisible part possesses it.
ϛIn the act of being cut or being in pain, there is then once again fear and
the like. These move everything toward the outside. Each time there are fears,
the spirit original: "πνεῦμα" — the vital breath or intermediary between soul and body. will not be more subject to passion; for this is a weight.
ζSince the soul fears or grieves; it is not the body that does these things on its own;
but it remains the passion of the body and its movement. But it belongs to that which
is filled and emptied. A reference to the Platonic idea that physical desires and pains are the results of the body being "replenished" or "depleted." How then is the living being—

But if pain is a perceived thing, how then can it be the motion of the body, or should it be rather that the soul
perceives it? And grief—how indeed is it one's own grief?
And how is there desire? For it is necessary then either that the whole be a composite, of which the cause is
the remaining body, or that the soul learns by suffering. But now
one cannot even say this of the grazing animals, if indeed there is to be sensation alone.
Or is there not a "judgment" through the soul prior to itself? But rather in sensations. And many things are such that
the sensations belong to the body. Why then is there judgment? Since judgment exists; and concerning
thought, it is not possible to say how; for this too is ours.
In addition to these things, is it pure, or a combination of them, being alone?
But whether it is in the body or that through which the living being exists. Or concerning these things; or if
in this way. Or even if the body itself is the living being. And the soul uses the
ζbody as if it were an instrument. Plotinus explores the Aristotelian and Platonic metaphor of the soul as a pilot or a craftsman using the body as a tool. And it follows the things that come next, first through the body;
so that in regard to such passions, it is not necessary for the soul to be
separated; but it was possible to use the body while being present with it.
From which things come the passions and the pains? But how does
"to use" signify anything? Or would it be the damages to the body itself? Or indeed
the griefs; as the poet says; Likely a reference to Homer, whom Plotinus often quotes to illustrate psychological states. and generally that everything concerning the body
happens as a whole, so that there are also desires. (And yet how could pain
arise from these? But rather it is the body reporting its own state;
for it is corporeal; to the body, whatever might be necessary. Or again, is some of
this in the soul? How? For we would not have this from a thing that has suffered, but as a
suffering thing. For this remains as something suffered; while being used. But how would the soul
ηbe separated or be a dweller? Being separated. Or that which gives the soul to be the user.
Or even after the separation, philosophy brings it [to purity]; or that it
exists after... but either it exists after... or like a perfection
being present; so that it would not be something separated. Or for there is that which is
like a pilot; or in one way it is the thing itself, and in another way it is that.
I say "in a way." Separated. That which is prior to the body; and that which...