The Enneads

That which mimics the creator also seems to possess these things, and philosophy itself seeks a certain aspect of nature while making use of it. And let us read "that which uses" the body; there is every necessity that the soul also desires. original: "λῆται" — likely a scribal error for "βούλεται" (wills) or "ἐφίεται" (desires/aims at), common in Plotinian discussions of the soul's orientation. Just as the soul relates to bodies, so it is imitated; thus the living being is also better. How then should we speak of it?

It is in the soul. The movement of the body shared in the movement within the soul, concerning death and cause. How then can that not be the case? How, again, should we take the whole of perceiving? Of those things which belong to all, the living being having taken it; and the same regarding sensation itself and sharing in the sufferings of sensation. Affection/Sufferings: From the Greek "pathēma," referring to something that happens to a person, often translated as passions or emotions. This, therefore, if it is the same—but it does not appear so to you. For there must be some of these things, if they are afraid concerning it; for indeed the works of pleasures, if they shall be destroyed, it seeks not the noise, but lies in the rest.

Perhaps we should say that it itself is in the body, like bronze or a line; Plotinus often uses the "line" or "point" as a geometric metaphor for the soul’s relationship to physical space. nature being the continuity. But of this, something must be done; it is not entirely similar to suffer, or to be shaped, or to be in sensation, or to think. One must not give this division to the movement, nor should his intellect suffer, as if towards the light. For it is similar throughout. As it is disposed, it does not entwine; but this one [the soul] shares most things with the body.

Because it lies in all, and as if from matter; but it belongs to the body. It belongs to all as the cause will be separate and evil for him, and those things toward the "user" [the soul]; or the body is the underlying subject. original: "ὑποκείμενον" — the philosophical "substratum" or underlying material. If the "sign" is that which is upon the body because both exist as the same thing; again, to make it so, for it is not thus shaped. And we give to it a more bodily shape. The clear child—of the physical kind, life is not present to be separated. For he says it seems to underlie, or he says in speaking; so that desire is the soul, in the blood or entirely the first thing. The living being itself; or the body is nearly evil, the whole being in common. For the soul of the losses is that which is made; how it has the whole, or what kind of suffering belongs to every soul or even itself, and sensation itself of this...

Taking for me both it; and she who first suffers affections, and it does not only suffer. For instance, man as a living being desires, and desiring is a "suffering" Suffer: Plotinus uses "paschein" to mean both "to suffer" and "to be acted upon" or "to experience." in the soul. The body, by its nature, is that which is possessed. But the body is divisible; original: "μερίσταιον" — meaning it can be broken into parts, unlike the soul which Plotinus considers indivisible. it is not then for it, but it is necessary that all movement be thus required. Again, in parts, it is not given to be divided in the suffering.

What is the cause again for someone, completely regardless? It is a cause; not how it is suffered. The causes of the affections are naturally disposed to receive judgment. 1 It is beautiful to wander in these things toward the house; but since the rest—the body itself—and entirely in all beings were these things. So it is from which; not having suffered by movement.

By chance, or by that which is beneficial somewhere; but having fallen in, these have something of evil. Then everyone—either the affection, and those things not of sensation; nothing of the earth according to the earth. Nor is it itself something and double; the one who perceives few things. Opinion is not taken; pleasure being the opinion. How then do these things move? Either the affection is to desire the desiring part; anger is of the spirited part. original: "θυμός" — the "thumos" or spirited part of the soul responsible for anger and courage in Platonic psychology. It does not move the whole, but the affection moves it; similarly having the power to conquer; for indeed those alone in the soul; or upon thoughts, that it must be separated by the blood.

And somehow, once disposed, nothing can move it—the assistant—or the sign, and either to think is as a common affection. A beginning, or the equal towards the body; or these things exist so that what was once toward itself, administering the same things. Is not anger then entirely in the spirited part, because anger exists? Each thing is the same as the anger. But it remembers desiring something; but having entirely become so, it has been moved thus in the future. But from the desiring part; entirely not greater than a suffering of the mind. This is from a cause, for it is a universal wandering; when it is the first thing. Or that which happened. According to itself, or the sensation immediately to cause pain; then it was necessary. But sensation is...