Commentary on Plato's Timaeus

First, we might say that divine things are not neglectful, nor is Providence original: "ἐπιμέλεια" (epimeleia). Often translated as "care" or "providence," referring to the way divine beings oversee and maintain the order of the cosmos. contrary to their nature. This would not be fitting for the divine, unless perhaps it were because they were no more concerned with humans than anything else. These matters are indeed so, and this happens according to reason.

The body, then, is neither the all-ruling principle, nor the divine, nor that which is superior to it, nor the creative and productive power; for this reason, it is beyond all other things. But if it is not because of such a thing, but because of the divine, then the God who is in this universe would not exist. Yet if it is both through itself and through that God, they would not be neglected. First, then, one might say that Providence is not even a part of Nature; for it is not the divine itself, but exists because of it. For the body of the universe does not exist because of that, nor is it the body of Nature; for it is not a whole by virtue of the body or its power, but a whole because of that which comes from the power. Or rather, Nature is not God, nor is everything divine; for the divine would not exist unless it possessed something. First, then, is that which is greater than Nature, and superior, and spiritual, not even by its power. These things are such because Nature is the cause of sensible things original: "αἰσθητῶν" (aistheton). Things that can be perceived by the five senses, as opposed to "intelligible" things understood only by the mind., just as if it were a kind of art—not a building art, but a making art—not even if it were for this purpose, but for the sake of existence.

Secondly, there is something in Nature within the universe directed toward the Most Beautiful original: "κάλλιστον" (kalliston). In Platonic thought, the "Most Beautiful" or "Best" is the ultimate goal or archetype of creation. which it produces, because the lesser does not exist for the sake of the greater, but the greater for its own sake. Therefore, it is not by nature for the sake of man, nor for the sake of other living creatures. If, however, it is because of the Intellect original: "νοῦν" (noun). The divine mind containing the eternal patterns of all things. arriving—not into humans, nor into the things of the gods, but into the whole, and into heaven itself—it is also from the body that the whole possesses its nature.

What then is it that acts? There is something, for the reason we stated, the whole, and the body, and the soul; nothing would exist if not for the whole and Nature, even if it is the irrational part, which is indeed called Nature. These things are the whole; and if the whole were the whole by the economy original: "οἰκονομίᾳ" (oikonomia). Here meaning the divine arrangement, management, or "household order" of the universe. of the God of the universe. Every soul belongs to no other, because the nature of the universe itself is not reason, but will be an incidental addition to the whole, acting as Nature. But if then there is a rational community and a social element in the community of the whole.

Perhaps we might assume: Nature crafts the single essence existing in the universe, and the nature of the gods, but the Soul, having distributed reason, also crafts the things from itself. Because of this, it will make something kindred to each. But if someone seeks after such a composition, the archetype original: "παραδειγματικὸν" (paradeigmatikon). The "paradigm" or original model after which the physical world is patterned. would not be the cause, but rather that which is in the form. These things, then, not only admit the questions asked but also produce the likely results. If, therefore, God gave Nature to the whole, and such a thing produces; what then is the "Most Beautiful," or as Plato himself says? Or will the superior part of the universe and the marvelous not agree? And not man, and indeed all the parts, not as additions or a multitude of such things; the animals are not reasonably the weakest of things. For with these same things is Reason; but if they are powers, it seems to be the opposite. This is a difficult way for us. If indeed the things that come to be by nature are worthy of a philosopher for us. Let us first consider the superior part, and what the reasonings and the things according to it will be, and what it wants the essence of Nature to be.

It must be said, then, that Nature itself is not the Intellect; for the Intellect is superior, and the body is secondary. Having a natural state of servitude; knowing at least what is in nature and from where it proceeded. It would not then exist for the sake of another, nor would it be made by this; for the archetypes are not in matter. The nature of each is as something incorporeal. Nor is the form, as something unchangeable, in nature, nor is the whole, even if it is the all...

...of this, one might say that we blame the soul of nature as dwelling in the world beneath divine things. But if the natural powers make it so as to overshadow or rather to illuminate, let it never be said that one descends and the other is a failure. But if we consider the one that precedes each of the divine things—if indeed there are souls that act—it would not be according to nature, or it is within this.

But the Soul of the Whole does not act through natural necessity, but by its own choice. For it is fitting that it itself is something of that nature directly; for if those things that act do so through bodies, then the living thing would be as if in a body, and not as if in itself. But the being of the living thing is not in the body, but rather the body is in the living thing. This is a famous Neoplatonic reversal of the common view; the soul is not "contained" by the body like a vessel, but the body exists within the soul's sustaining power.

And if the souls act, it would not be according to nature, if indeed those very living things are those whose being is not in a body. How then is the irrational in the body? For even the divine appears in the body, yet not as if it were in a body. But when one says that Nature is not incorporeal, but belongs to that nature which possesses the body, it will not be the divine; and the things in this universe would not be divine. For how is it possible for a God to be, who is in a body?

If then this is not the case, we do not blame Nature, but the Soul that is in the body, and through it the things in the world; or if you wish, also toward the whole with the gods, the God in the world. For it appears according to the divine, not as if in a body; and indeed the things in this universe—for how is it possible for a God to be, who is in a body? If then this is not the case, we do not blame Nature, but the Soul that is in the body, and through it the things in the world; coming from the most beautiful.

Perhaps Nature is the cause of sensible things, acting as a Soul; therefore that which is in this world is well-tempered by Reason into the things of all and the rest, and such a thing—how might they be wrapped around them? Just things have been handed down to us, although it was dear to produce vice even from that which is according to nature. And to speak for ourselves, nothing held back from the things of the gods and the things in the world; such as not even having a nature of its own. But that of matter... and the whole. How shall we be blamed? The soul is lesser if it is not itself. It will be strong, not but of itself, nor even most beautiful. The extremes seem so; nor even the world, but the greater. What if from the whole the things toward them? Because not even from purpose, as the council and toward such ones. Again, the world-making original: "κοσμοποιεῖν" (kosmopoiein). The act of constructing or creating the universe. of this and the not even, having good fortune. It would not be toward the... and the archetypes, as has been accepted, as we might assume, as it has been handed down. But besides that which is said... world-making of this and the not even... and the things were being brought to life, and to fashion God; and not that which is according to itself, and the world having something?; to be a God worthy of God; so that we are called of the gods. What if from the whole we are able? What if from the world? Things coming from itself. How is the birth? Things coming from itself. How is the birth? For because of this, the things that come to be are not pure; but the greater, which appears? Of the... truly... for where will someone dispute any of the things beyond? For how is it possible for a God to be, who is in... for where will he dispute? Or he does not manage the household. For it appears according to the divine, not as if in a body; or he does not manage the household. For it appears according to the divine, not as if in a body; and indeed the things in this universe would not be divine; but Nature is the beginning.