Commentary on Plato's Timaeus

...we assign to each craft, so that it might work well toward its end and not pursue other things; for either nature made nothing self-sufficient in anyone, so that each might have its own proper end to achieve, or because we are left behind by those very pursuits which were fitting for each, or those of such a nature. Do you not think so? — I do not, he said. — Or is it not just as we ourselves taught you so strictly, and as you ought to have used? Or could you hardly answer us when the specific character is of such a kind, or not? — Certainly, he said. — What then? Is there not also a specific quality in the nature of dogs for the sake of this private service, being spirited original: "θυμοειδές" (thumoeides). This refers to the "high-spirited" or emotional part of the soul, which Proclus links to the protective powers in the universe., swift, and strong to strike and to pursue? — What else? I believe all things are so by nature. Or do I think all things are private? — Therefore, they are well-disposed toward him and his places are strengthened; we would wish this, or it is necessary for those of a base nature to be toward strangers. It will not cease any less; this, then, which we said, we should wonder at as many things are done for the sake of profit. But regarding what happens privately and before the main point, regarding the practice of life always—or do you not think this is also a private matter? — It seems to be the very best. — First then, what I said: let it not be easily viewed as being so different unless one allows it first. Since it will seem that the tension of this has been stretched out, or how the necessary thing is. Or what do you think? — It must not be, he said, because not all things belong to all those who are kin, nor to private citizens. To my child, the cause regarding this is neither the summons nor the similar offices. The gods themselves do not know the same thing; they deceive by nature those who have the mind in their soul, so that nothing is placed by those before or in him—this is the Creator original: "δημιουργὸς" (dēmiourgos). The divine craftsman who fashions the world in Plato's philosophy., is it not so? — In this way, at least. — You will agree with these things. And these are accurate; and do you correctly perceive one another? — The very name of God, which others also prayed to the gods for. But those things are paid back as if from God; thus one should explain him, such as even the daring things that appear in the generations. There is a distinction and a struggle, but the work belongs to the beginnings, or through those so that he is not unworthy. Neither is he to me at all; there is indeed a choice worthy of them, a cause of life; from where he begins, he has reverence. Of the creation, we held reverence and purity as an existence, not even for the bodies which seem to be, he says, the masters of the intertwining powers. For it will not be of these. — Not I, he said. — Since it is well then, or must be made; do you choose to set it aside in this way? — It is clear that toward the nature of those who are intertwined, it holds the same things, and not each of these in everything. Nature acts so as to arrange something; or is the Creator thus for the city, not even for what such things are private from them, or each one strongly, not even of himself? The value of the essence original: "ουσίας" (ousias). Reality or being. is molded; those whom we say will be introduced as if submitting to them. —
(ω) Are these men themselves going to be guardians of the city? — It is so, he said. — What then? Will he not do anything to those who commit crimes? — Two hundred on the part of the rulers — toward the same by nature, friends are so difficult to fight, and strangers...

...they happen to be of the same kind. —
ω What do you wish? Will our guardians be gentle toward their own people, but harsh toward enemies? If not, before they destroy others, they will first destroy themselves through wakefulness and reputation. The guardians, it seems, are guardians only toward strangers, but that other thing we are not able to find. For neither when they are gentle toward their own, can they also be harsh toward enemies. Is what we say true, my friend, or is it the opposite? — And what is this? — That the character of the soul in other animals one would not think exists, nor indeed in men, such as to be toward strangers in such a way as to be harsh. — Certainly. — What then? Is it not also this way with dogs? — How? — That toward their own and those they are used to, they are as gentle as can be, but the opposite toward those they do not know. — Very much so. — This, then, is also in dogs, nor is it otherwise in the nature of dogs, which is indeed worthy of wonder. — Why so? — Because toward whomever they see that they do not know, they are harsh, even though they have suffered no evil from him before. But whomever they recognize, they greet, even if they have never received any good from him. Or have you not yet wondered at this? — Not quite, he said, until now have I paid attention. But that it does this is clear. — But indeed, this affection of its nature seems elegant and truly philosophical original: "φιλόσοφον" (philosophon). Proclus is quoting Plato's argument that a dog is "philosophical" because it distinguishes friend from foe based on knowledge and ignorance.. — In what way? — In the way, I said, that by seeing, by learning and not, it judges both the friend and the enemy by nothing else than by knowing the one and being ignorant of the other. And yet, how could it not be a lover of learning, that which defines the friend and the enemy by what is familiar and what is foreign? — In no way can it not be. — But surely, is not the love of learning and the love of wisdom the same? — They are the same. — Shall we then confidently posit also in the case of a man, if he is to be gentle toward his own and those he knows, that he must by nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of learning? — Let us posit it, he said. — He who is to be a truly noble and good guardian original: "καλὸς κἀγαθὸς... φύλαξ" (kalos kagathos... phylax). The ideal Greek gentleman-warrior. of the city will be, for us, philosophical and spirited and swift and strong in nature. — Entirely so, he said. — This man, then, would be such as he is. But in what way will these men be reared and educated by us? And is it of any use to us for seeing that for the sake of which we examine everything—namely, in what way justice and injustice come to be in a city? We ask this so that we do not leave out the argument, or again go through it at too great a length. — And the brother of Glaucon said: I certainly expect this inquiry to lead toward that. — By Zeus, I said, my friend Adeimantus, then it must not be abandoned, not even if it happens to be very long. — No indeed. — Come then, just as if we were telling stories in a myth original: "μύθωι" (mythōi). Plato often uses "myths" or "likely stories" to explain complex truths. and enjoying leisure, let us educate the men in our speech. — It is necessary. — What then is the education? Or is it difficult to find a better one than that found by the passage of long time? This is, surely, gymnastics for the body and music original: "μουσική" (mousikē). In the ancient sense, this included poetry, literature, and all the arts of the Muses, not just melody. for the soul. — It is indeed. — Shall we then begin educating with music before gymnastics? — How could we not? — And do you include myths in music, or not? — I do. — And there are two kinds of myths, the true ones...