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Significant bleed-through from the reverse side of the manuscript. Marginalia and lower annotations are in a smaller, more cursive hand. Some words at the edges are slightly faded.
...that which is from the beginning? . . that which is from the beginning? but? . . . the same as that which is from itself?
In the study of nature? original: "en tois physikois" among the ancients, some say? there is no beginning of? existing things, but rather? this [the Infinite] contains? all things, as Anaximander? says? ... being is indivisible? ......teaching, and regarding that for which the letter "a" stands, to know it . mingled—
but rather in the manner of nature. Physically, however, all
[thinkers] happen to speak to them. And perhaps even well; for since
[it is necessary] to discuss them . it is necessary for the philosopher to exercise
me. It is necessary to consider the properties of all things . since "being" is spoken of in many ways
being Greek: "to on" – that which exists; the core subject of metaphysics., one must see how those who say the "all is one" the all is one Greek: "to pan hen" – the doctrine of Monism, that everything in the universe is a single, unified thing. speak.
Do they mean all things are substance original: "ousia" – the fundamental "whatness" of a thing. . or quantities original: "posa" . or qualities original: "poia" . and again .
whether all things are one substance . or one man? . or one horse
. or one soul . or of what sort. Or if it be this: such as "white" or
"hot" or some of the other? such things . for all these
differ greatly and are impossible to maintain . for if there
will be substance and quality and quantity . whether these are
separated from one another or not, then existing things are many . but if
everything is quality or quantity, whether substance exists or not,
it is absurd . if it is necessary to call the impossible "absurd." For nothing
else is separable except for substance . for all things
are spoken of as being predicated of the underlying substance. But Melissus
says that being is infinite original: "apeiron" – boundless, without limit. . therefore being is a certain quantity . for the
infinite is found in quantity; but for substance to be infinite, or an affection, or
a quality, is not possible except by accident;
that is, if they are also at the same time certain quantities. For the definition of the infinite
makes use of quantity, but not of substance or quality. If,
therefore, there is both substance and quantity, being is two and not one . but if it is
substance alone, it is not infinite . nor will it have any magnitude .
for it would then be a certain quantity. Furthermore, since "the one" the one original: "to hen" – unity or the concept of a single thing. itself is spoken of in many ways
just as "being" is, we must consider in what way they say
the "all" exists . for it is called "one" if it is continuous, or if it is indivisible
or if the definition of it is the same and one . The definition of "what it was to be" Aristotle’s technical phrase for "essence." . just as "must"
and "wine." If then the one is continuous, it is many . for it is divisible to infinity .?
But there is a difficulty regarding the part and the whole . perhaps not relevant to the argument . . .?
but if it is "one" as indivisible, nothing will be either a quantity or a quality .?